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to make the abolition of visas in 
relations between the EU and the 
Eastern European countries possible, 
the ”spell cast” must be broken on  
this issue. With the present levels 
of mobility and people-to-people, 
business and political contacts the 
introduction of a visa-free regime 
will be a natural consequence of the 
liberalisation processes which have 
been at work for years. Moreover,  
the decision to lift the visa requirement 
is unlikely to significantly stimulate an 
increase in migration pressure from 
Eastern European countries but could 
reduce the operating costs  
of expanded Schengen consular 
network. Lifting the visa requirement 
for Eastern European citizens can be 
temporary and conditional and allow 
for actual implementation of an 
increased conditionality rule.  
in political terms, making visa 
liberalisation a key issue would 
fundamentally change the partners’ 
approach to the Eastern Partnership 
and would provide a link to the 
Partnership for Modernisation targeted 
at Russia.
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Key points 
•	 The	 present	 socio-political	 situation	 in	 the	 European	 Union	
and	 the	global	financial	crisis	are	creating	rather	unfavour-
able	conditions	for	the	process	of	visa	liberalisation	between	
the	 EU	 and	 the	 countries	 of	 Eastern	 Europe.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	the	threat	posed	by	irregular	migration	from	this	area	
is	incomparably	lower	than	from	North	African	countries,	and	
is	decreasing	due	to	unfavourable	demographic	trends	and	the	
increasing	possibilities	 of	 legal	 employment	 abroad	 for	 resi-
dents	of	Eastern	European	countries.	Furthermore,	 the	bor-
der	management	system	in	Eastern	Europe	is	definitely	more	
efficient	 than	several	years	ago.	The	countries	discussed	are	
also	competently	fulfilling	their	obligations	linked	to	the	im-
plementation	of	the	readmission	agreements	they	have	signed	
with	the	EU.	The	visa	refusal	rate	at	Schengen	consulates	in	
Eastern	Europe	is	successively	falling.
•	 The	issue	of	mobility	and	visa-free	movement,	with	adequate	
conditions	set	to	ensure	security,	could	add	new	momentum	
to	the	Eastern	Partnership	(EaP)	and	make	the	partner	states	
more	interested	in	this	initiative.	Russia	could	also	be	includ-
ed	in	this	process,	which	could	become	a	natural	axis	provid-
ing	a	connection	with	the	Partnership	for	Modernisation	pro-
ject.	All	this	would	lead	to	an	improvement	in	the	stability	of	
the	EU’s	neighbourhood,	and	it	would	also	encourage	Eastern	
European	countries	to	make	efforts	at	modernisation.
•	 To	bring	about	the	lifting	of	the	visa	requirement	in	relations	
between	the	EU	and	Eastern	European	countries	it	is	essential	
that	 the	 spell	 cast	on	 this	 issue	be	broken.	Now	 is	 the	 stage	
which	brings	the	long-term	liberalisation	process	to	its	conclu-
sion;	we	are	not	witnessing	a	breakthrough	with	unpredict-
able	consequences	for	the	EU.	Lifting	the	visa	requirement	for	
citizens	of	Eastern	European	countries	may	be	temporary	and	
conditional.	It	is	worth	combining	it	with	the	implementation	
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of	such	solutions	aimed	at	 improving	 the	EU’s	 security	such	
as	the	smart	borders	system1	or	making	the	mechanisms	for	
moving	the	states	from	the	‘white’	to	the	‘black’	visa	list	more	
flexible.	In	the	testing	phase,	visa	liberation	can	be	introduced	
with	regard	to	certain	categories	of	travellers	or	in	connection	
with	a	precisely	defined	event.
•	 The	best	solution	would	be	the	introduction	of	a	visa-free	re-
gime	for	Ukraine	and	Moldova	at	the	same	time	or	over	a	short	
time-span.	It	will	be	difficult	to	lift	the	visa	requirement	for	
citizens	of	Russia	at	the	same	time	given	the	size	of	this	coun-
try,	its	problems	with	internal	security,	and	the	need	to	apply	
special	regulations.	However,	visa-free	movement	for	certain	
categories	of	travellers	from	Russia,	especially	those	who	have	
a	positive	history	of	trips	to	the	Schengen	Area	(‘bona fide trav-
ellers’),	appears	to	be	very	realistic.	Owing	to	this	EU	member	
states	 could	 regain	 interest	 in	 the	 entire	 liberalisation	 pro-
cess,	 which	 is	 becoming	 an	 overly	 technical	 issue.	 Belarus,	
despite	the	present	difficulties,	should	also	not	be	deprived	of	
the	prospect	of	visa-free	movement.	In	the	short	term,	lower-
ing	 the	price	of	 the	uniform	Schengen	visas	 for	Belarusians	
should	be	considered,	regardless	of	the	possibilities	for	sign-
ing	a	visa	facilitation	agreement	with	Minsk.
•	 The	negotiation	process	cannot	be	too	long,	and	the	EU	–	along	
with	the	requirements	–	should	also	create	an	incentive	sys-
tem.	It	is	worth	considering	introducing	visa-free	movement	
conditionally,	when	most	of	the	criteria	have	been	met,	which	
should	be	accompanied	by	putting	into	operation	a	mechanism	
1	 In	October	2011,	the	EC	suggested	modern	border	management	methods	be	
introduced	on	the	external	borders	of	the	EU	in	the	future,	i.e.	the	‘smart	
borders’	system,	which	would	include	introducing	an	electronic	entry-exit	
registration	system	and	a	system	for	the	pre-screening	 	of	 travellers.	The	
main	principle	inherent	in	the	new	idea	is	the	use	of	different	border	control	
methods,	depending	on	whether	a	given	traveller	poses	a	migration	risk	or	
not.	
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for	monitoring	further	progress.	This	increased	conditional-
ity	policy	could	provide	an	additional	incentive	to	the	Eastern	
European	governments	and	make	them	more	inclined	to	fulfil	
their	obligations	with	regard	to	the	EU	at	a	faster	rate.
•	 The	 key	 short-term	 challenges	 include	 the	 introduction	 of	
biometric	 documents	 and	 adequate	 databases,	 and	 ensuring	
the	due	protection	of	borders.	In	the	long	term,	the	EU	should	
press	for	the	ministries	of	internal	affairs	to	be	reformed	and	
the	 judiciary	and	the	system	for	combating	corruption	to	be	
reinforced.	In	the	case	of	Russia	and	Belarus,	a	change	in	the	
restrictive	 registration	 policy	 applicable	 to	 citizens	 of	 EU	
member	 states	 staying	 in	 those	 countries	 should	be	 the	key	
element.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
12
8
introduction
This	paper	is	aimed	at	presenting	the	opportunities	and	the	chal-
lenges	linked	to	the	introduction	of	a	visa-free	regime	in	EU-East-
ern	Europe	 relations,	 and	 the	 attempts	 to	 propose	 solutions	 for	
breaking	the	lengthy	deadlock	this	issue	has	faced	since	the	col-
lapse	of	the	USSR.	At	the	outset,	the	background	of	the	visa	liber-
alisation	process	between	the	EU	and	Eastern	European	countries	
will	be	outlined.	Then	the	progress	in	negotiations	between	indi-
vidual	neighbouring	countries	and	the	EU	and	also	existing	co-
operation	mechanisms	are	described.	The	next	section	provides	
an	analysis	of	the	strong	and	the	weak	points	of	the	neighbouring	
states,	and	assesses	 their	 level	of	 readiness	 for	 the	 introduction	
of	visa-free	movement	with	the	EU.	The	last	part	presents	recom-
mendations:	how	to	steer	the	further	negotiation	process	so	that	
the	ultimate	goal	can	be	achieved	and	will	be	beneficial	for	both	
the	European	Union	and	the	governments	and	societies	of	Eastern	
European	states.
This	text	provides	a	description	of	those	Eastern	European	coun-
tries	which	share	a	border	with	the	European	Union	and	which	
are	encountering	serious	problems	due	to	the	existence	of	the	visa	
regime	with	the	EU:	the	three	countries	participating	in	the	East-
ern	Partnership	which	are	 closest	 to	 the	EU	 (Ukraine,	Moldova	
and	Belarus),	and	also	Russia,	which	is	not	covered	by	the	EaP.	The	
choice	of	these	countries	was	based	on	their	progress	in	prepara-
tions,	on	the	migration	situation	and	a	realistic	political	evalua-
tion	of	the	possibility	to	introduce	a	visa-free	regime	with	the	EU.	
In	other	words,	the	basic	criterion	was	the	assessment	of	whether	
EU	member	states	and	 institutions	and	 the	neighbouring	states	
see	 this	scenario	as	possible	and	desirable,	and	what	conditions	
should	be	met	for	this	plan	to	be	successful.
Moldova	and	Ukraine	are	 the	most	 advanced	 in	 the	negotiation	
process	on	visa	liberalisation	with	the	EU.	However,	they	do	not	
have	 too	many	 supporters	 in	 the	 EU,	 who	 would	 be	 willing	 to	
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lift	 the	visa	requirement	within	a	short	timeframe.	On	the	oth-
er	hand,	 the	visa	refusal	rate	 for	 the	citizens	of	 these	countries	
at	the	EU	consulates	has	been	falling	(at	a	much	faster	speed	for	
Ukrainians	than	Moldovans).	The	European	Commission	has	also	
noted	that	the	functioning	of	the	local	border	traffic	regime	on	the	
EU’s	borders	with	these	countries	is	safe.	In	turn,	Russia	has	not	
agreed	to	be	subject	to	the	conditionality	principle	in	visa	issues	
(liberalisation	in	exchange	for	internal	reforms),	to	which	other	
Eastern	European	countries	have	consented.	The	EU-Russia	ne-
gotiations	on	the	introduction	of	a	visa-free	regime	have	been	in	
place	for	many	years;	however,	little	progress	has	been	observed	
in	this	field.	It	appears	now	that	both	parties	are	increasingly	in-
terested	in	breaking	the	deadlock.	In	terms	of	meeting	the	formal	
and	legal	requirements,	Belarus	is	in	last	place.	However,	in	the	
case	of	Belarusians,	the	visa	refusal	rate	at	EU	consulates	is	the	
lowest	in	this	region.
All	the	countries	discussed	(including	Belarus)	have	declared	that	
lifting	the	visa	regime	in	relations	with	the	EU	is	a	priority	issue	
for	them.	The	abolition	of	visas	to	the	EU	is	also	unquestionably	
supported	 by	 public	 opinion.	Moldova	 is	 the	most	 advanced	 as	
regards	the	issuing	of	biometric	documents;	Russia	also	already	
issues	 such	 documents.	 Neither	 Ukraine	 nor	 Belarus	 have	 in-
troduced	biometric	documents	as	yet.	The	main	problem	all	 the	
countries	in	this	region	share	are	the	difficulties	with	introducing	
the	rule	of	law,	the	manifestations	of	which	include	the	inefficient	
and	weak	judiciary	and	high	corruption	levels.	The	Achilles	heel	
of	these	states	 is	 their	ministries	of	 internal	affairs.	These	have	
not	 been	 reformed	 and	 are	managed	 in	 a	 non-transparent	way	
when	they	should	be	playing	the	coordinating	role	in	the	process	
of	the	liberalisation	of	the	movement	of	people	with	the	EU.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
12
10
i. the crisis of the eu’s migration  
and neighbourhood policies 
1. Problems of the EU’s migration policy 
Since	the	EU	at	present	needs	to	deal	with	the	crisis	of	its	migra-
tion	 and	 enlargement	 policies	 and	 also	 fundamental	 economic	
problems	inside	the	eurozone,	a	 large	part	of	EU	member	states	
would	prefer	the	issue	of	lifting	the	visa	requirement	for	Ukraine	
and	Moldova	to	be	postponed	for	as	long	as	possible.	Supporters	
of	delaying	the	resolution	of	the	visa	issue	claim	that	all	the	crite-
ria	for	lifting	the	visa	regime,	which	are	often	excessive,	must	be	
met.	Therefore,	there	is	a	risk	that	Ukraine	and	Moldova	will	get	
stuck	in	a	never-ending	negotiation	process.	On	the	other	hand,	
visa	 liberalisation	 in	 relations	 between	 the	 EU	 and	Russia	may	
gain	momentum	owing	 to	 the	 adoption	of	 a	 joint	 action	plan	 to	
this	effect.	However,	if	it	is	conducted	on	the	grounds	of	political	
premises	alone,	this	will	in	no	way	make	the	Russian	government	
more	 inclined	 to	 implement	 reforms.	 In	 turn,	Belarusians,	who	
are	increasingly	cut	off	from	the	outside	world	due	to	the	nature	
of	the	political	regime	in	their	country,	may	direct	their	aversion	
and	disillusionment	also	against	the	European	Union.
Eastern	European	countries	are	watching	several	current	devel-
opments	with	anxiety:	the	delay	in	the	acceptance	of	Bulgaria	and	
Romania	into	the	Schengen	area,	the	temporary	reinstatement	of	
border	control	by	some	EU	member	states	on	 their	borders	and	
France’s	and	Holland’s	desire	to	challenge	the	principle	of	the	free	
movement	of	people	within	the	EU	by	introducing	regulations	on	
the	expulsion	of	undesirable	EU	citizens.	The	media	and	experts	
in	 the	partner	 states	have	also	been	watching	 the	 influx	of	 ref-
ugees	 to	 the	EU	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	revolutions	 in	 the	Arab	
world	closely	and	have	noted	the	difficulties	individual	member	
states	have	had	with	accepting	them.
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Given	this	situation,	the	eastern	neighbours	are	asking	the	ques-
tion,	‘If	some	countries	in	the	EU	fear	the	free	movement	of	peo-
ple	of	EU	member	states	citizens	of,	is	the	European	Union	ready	
to	liberalise	its	policy	with	regard	to	its	external	partners?’	Since	
the	 governments	 of	 these	 countries	 tend	 to	 answer	 ‘no’	 to	 this	
question,	their	disbelief	in	the	possibility	of	the	visa	regime	be-
ing	abolished	in	relation	with	the	EU	is	increasing.	This	in	turn	
is	 strengthening	 their	 reluctance	 to	 reform	 the	 migration	 and	
border	policies	in	line	with	EU	requirements.	Summing	up,	frus-
tration	and	de-motivation	are	increasing	in	both	the	EU	and	the	
neighbouring	countries.
2. The future of the Eastern Partnership
A	 further	 liberalisation	 of	 the	movement	 of	 people	 in	 relations	
with	Eastern	European	countries	 is	also	being	held	back	due	 to	
the	 growing	 disaffection	 with	 the	 Eastern	 Partnership	 project	
(both	 inside	 the	 EU	 and	 among	 the	 beneficiary	 states)	 result-
ing	from	the	impossibility	to	achieve	real	political	and	economic	
goals,	and	thus	from	the	weakening	of	political	will.	The	strictly	
economic	approach	to	the	EaP	–	given	the	crisis	in	the	Euroland	
and	Russia’s	economic	offensive	in	the	region	–	adopted	so	far	is	
unable	to	add	impetus	to	this	initiative.	Secondly,	in	effect	of	the	
enlargement	policy	crisis,	an	opening	up	would	be	impossible	to	
be	brought	about	in	the	political	sphere.	The	harmonious	develop-
ment	of	the	EaP	is	also	likely	to	be	upset	by	unfavourable	politi-
cal	trends	taking	place	in	countries	covered	by	the	EaP,	especially	
the	case	of	Yulia	Tymoshenko	–	whether	she	will	stay	 in	prison	
for	many	years	–	and	of	other	Ukrainian	prisoners.	This	may	have	
a	direct	impact	on	the	prospects	of	signing	an	association	agree-
ment	between	the	EU	and	Ukraine.	The	future	of	the	pro-Europe-
an	government	coalition	and	its	reform	agenda	is	also	unclear	in	
Moldova,	which	has	so	 far	been	 the	 leader	of	democratic	 trans-
formation.	Taking	this	into	consideration,	the	issue	of	mobility	–	
with	conditions	improving	security	adequately	set	–	could	make	
the	Eastern	European	countries	and	societies	more	interested	in	
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the	EaP.	This	approach	could	also	cover	Russia,	since	the	Partner-
ship	 for	Modernisation	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 successful	 project,	
given	the	fundamental	disagreements	between	the	EU	and	Russia	
regarding	its	nature	and	goals.
Doubtlessly,	provisions	of	the	declaration	developed	at	the	conclu-
sion	of	the	second	Eastern	Partnership	summit	were	a	ray	of	hope	
in	the	process	towards	liberalisation.	EU	member	states	agreed	to	
no	longer	define	the	visa-free	regime	as	a	long-term	goal	in	mu-
tual	relations	and	to	state	that	this	endeavour	could	be	success-
fully	realised	“within	due	time”,	provided	that	the	conditions	set	
in	the	action	plans	on	visa	liberalisation	have	been	met2.	Although	
this	declaration	changes	little	in	practice,	its	fundamental	value	
is	that	the	set	of	the	EU’s	requirements	to	be	met	by	Eastern	Euro-
pean	countries	has	been	defined,	even	if	this	set	is	very	complex.
2	 Joint	Declaration	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	Summit,	Warsaw,	29-30	Sep-
tember	2011,	p.	4.
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ii. the migration situation in eastern 
europe
1. The irregular migration threat
The	threat	of	 irregular	migration	from	Eastern	European	coun-
tries	to	the	EU	–	unlike	as	is	the	case	with	the	North	African	region	
–	 is	 falling.	 The	 greatest	 influx	 of	migrants	 from	 the	Common-
wealth	of	 Independent	States	 (CIS)	area	and	of	 transit	migrants	
from	Southern	Asia	and	Africa,	who	were	trying	to	travel	through	
Ukraine	illegally,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	through	Belarus	(the	EU’s	
borders	 with	 Russia	 and	 Moldova	 are	 definitely	 less	 popular)	
was	seen	in	the	late	20th	century.	At	that	time,	Ukrainian	border	
guards	detained	approximately	30,000	people	annually	who	were	
trying	to	cross	the	border	illegally.	Among	these	Ukrainians	and	
Russians	were	leading	in	the	statistics	of	countries	of	origin	of	ir-
regular	migrants	apprehended	in	the	EU.	It	needs	to	be	added	that	
the	 border	management	 system	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 was	 at	 that	
time	considerably	less	efficient	than	at	present.
In	 2008,	 the	Ukrainian	 border	 service	 apprehended	 6,100	 indi-
viduals	attempting	 to	cross	 the	border	 illegally,	4,800	 individu-
als	in	2009	and	also	4,800	in	2010.	3,200	irregular	migrants	were	
apprehended	 in	 the	first	 six	months	 of	 2011.	Around	 90%	of	 all	
the	migrants	apprehended,	and	also	of	those	whose	entry	was	re-
jected,	are	citizens	of	CIS	countries	(mainly	residents	of	Moldova,	
the	 Russian	 Federation	 and	Uzbekistan),	 attempting	 to	 get	 into	
the	EU3.	While	such	migrants	used	to	be	identified	when	they	had	
managed	to	reach	the	Ukraine-EU	border	in	the	past,	recently	the	
Ukrainian	border	service	has	improved	its	capacity	of	apprehend-
ing	them	on	its	eastern	borders.
A	secondary	transit	route	for	illegal	migration	from	the	CIS	area	
as	well	as	Asia	and	Africa	to	the	EU	runs	through	Belarus.	Most	
3	 Data	from	the	State	Border	Guard	Service	of	Ukraine.	
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migrants	most	 likely	arrive	 in	Belarus	through	the	border	with	
Russia,	 which	 is	 totally	 open;	 hence	 the	 lack	 of	 statistical	 data	
from	this	border.	In	turn,	relatively	high	migration	activity	can	
be	 observed	 at	 the	 Ukrainian-Belarusian	 and	 the	 Belarusian-
Lithuanian	borders.	In	total,	in	2010	the	Belarusian	border	com-
mittee	detained	 1,387	 individuals	on	charges	of	violating	border	
legislation4.	Among	these	citizens	of	Georgia	were	predominant	
(mostly	apprehended	at	Minsk	airport)	and	following	them	citi-
zens	of	Kyrgyzstan	and	Moldova5.
However,	it	is	also	worth	keeping	in	mind	that	Eastern	European	
countries	 do	not	 always	 apply	 a	 clear	methodology	 for	 defining	
the	number	of	apprehended	irregular	migrants,	which	makes	it	
difficult	 to	 compare	 their	data	with	EU	statistics.	 Furthermore,	
some	border	sections	have	such	a	low	level	of	protection	that	the	
statistics	showing	the	number	of	apprehended	individuals	do	not	
allow	any	conclusions	whatsoever	to	be	made	about	the	existing	
trends	and	threats.
EU	statistics	also	show	that	the	threat	of	irregular	migration	from	
Eastern	Europe	is	low.	According	to	the	Frontex	reportsy,	illegal	
migration	at	 the	EU’s	eastern	 land	border	 is	remaining	at	a	sta-
ble	low	level.	As	the	most	recent	report	from	this	agency	shows,	
the	greatest	threat	on	the	eastern	Schengen	border	is	posed	not	by	
irregular	migration	but	by	cigarettes	and	fuel	smuggling	due	to	
the	substantial	difference	in	the	prices	of	these	goods	on	the	two	
sides	of	the	border,	and	also	the	smuggling	of	stolen	cars	from	EU	
member	states6.	The	risk	of	illegal	migration	is	the	highest	on	the	
Ukrainian-Slovakian	border,	which	accounts	 for	 around	40%	of	
all	apprehensions	on	the	eastern	EU	border.	Citizens	of	Moldova	
4	 This	is	a	broader	category	than	apprehension	for	attempted	illegal	border	
crossing.	
5	 Data	from	the	State	Border	Committee	of	Belarus.	
6	 Frontex,	 Eastern	 Borders	 Risk	 Analysis	 Network	 Annual	 Overview	 2011,	
Warsaw,	October	2011.	
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and	Georgia	(and,	from	outside	the	CIS	area,	citizens	of	Somalia,	
Afghanistan	and	Palestine)	are	predominant	among	the	migrants	
apprehended	by	EU	border	police.	In	turn,	entry	to	the	EU	is	most	
frequently	refused	to	citizens	of	the	neighbouring	countries,	i.e.	
Ukraine,	Belarus	and	Russia,	who	have	previously	breached	the	
rules	of	stay	in	the	EU7.
2. The readmission agreements
Readmission	agreements	are	a	perfect	touchstone	for	the	assess-
ment	of	the	migration	risk.	Over	the	past	two	years,	readmission	
agreements	have	been	put	into	effect	to	the	full	extent	between	
the	EU	and:	Ukraine	(from	1	January	2010),	Moldova	(from	1	Oc-
tober	2010)	and	Russia	(from	1	June	2010).	This	means	that	these	
countries	 accept	 from	 EU	 member	 states	 not	 only	 their	 own	
citizens	or	 foreigners	 caught	 red-handed	but	also	all	 irregular	
migrants,	 provided	 that	 it	 is	 proven	 that	 they	 came	 to	 the	 EU	
through	a	given	neighbouring	country.	The	readmission	agree-
ments	 in	 the	part	concerning	 the	return	of	own	citizens	came	
into	effect	in	2007–2008.
Contrary	to	expectations,	the	entry	into	force	of	these	agreements	
has	not	resulted	in	a	rapid	growth	in	the	number	of	individuals	
readmitted	from	the	EU	to	Eastern	European	countries8.	Firstly,	
this	confirms	the	thesis	that	Eastern	Europe	is	not	a	major	transit	
route	for	migrants	from	Africa	and	Asia	heading	for	the	European	
Union.	Secondly,	this	also	indicates	that,	as	regards	those	citizens	
of	Eastern	European	countries	who	break	the	rules	of	stay	in	EU	
member	states,	the	process	of	their	expulsion	was	already	quite	
unproblematic	before.	The	readmission	agreements	signed	with	
the	EU	did	not	bring	any	added	value	in	this	area.	The	change	was	
7	 Ibid.	
8	 Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	
Council,	Evaluation	of	EU	Readmission	Agreements,	COM	 (2011)	 76	Final,	
Brussels	23	February	2011.	
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mainly	of	a	statistical	nature;	the	returnees	started	to	be	shown	
in	EU	statistics	instead	of	bilateral	statistics.
Doubtlessly,	 readmission	 agreements	 (both	 at	 the	 community	
level	and	the	bilateral	agreements	which	apply	in	reality)9	appear	
to	be	an	effective	mechanism	in	combating	the	irregular	migra-
tion	of	own	citizens.	Proofs	of	this	include:	the	high	number	of	re-
quests	for	accepting	own	citizens	sent	by	EU	member	states	to	the	
partner	countries,	and	the	relatively	smooth	process	of	accepting	
readmitted	 individuals	 by	 the	 receiving	 states.	 Co-operation	 in	
this	 area	 is	 especially	 effective	with	Ukraine	and	Moldova,	 and	
a	little	worse	with	Russia,	since	EU	member	states	are	unable	to	
present	 the	 sufficient	number	of	documents	 required	by	Russia	
to	recognise	a	given	person	as	its	citizen.	In	the	case	of	Ukraine,	
co-operation	is	also	good	in	the	part	regarding	foreigners	trans-
ferred	with	the	application	of	the	accelerated	procedure,	i.e.	those	
who	are	detained	in	the	border	area	within	48	hours	of	illegally	
crossing	the	border.
Although	irregular	transit	migration	and	the	process	of	transfer-
ring	irregular	migrants	from	third	countries	by	EU	member	states	
to	the	partner	states	has	no	direct	impact	on	visa	liberalisation,	
it	 still	 shows	 the	 degree	 of	 the	 general	migration	 risk.	Citizens	
of	Eastern	European	countries	 tend	 to	be	 less	 likely	 to	 take	 the	
risk	of	illegal	migration.	This	region	is	also	becoming	less	popular	
with	irregular	transit	migrants.	Forged	passports	of	the	Eastern	
European	countries	are	used	relatively	rarely	by	irregular	transit	
migrants.	Above	all,	these	trends	show	that	border	management	
systems	have	improved	and	that	the	level	of	co-operation	between	
border	guards	on	both	sides	of	the	border	is	relatively	high.
9	 Although	the	previous	bilateral	agreements	(e.g.	Polish-Ukrainian)	lost	ef-
fect	upon	the	entry	into	force	of	the	community	readmission	agreements,	
they	in	fact	still	apply.	Given	the	lack	of	implementing	protocols	to	the	new	
type	of	agreements,	the	bilateral	agreements	are	still	used	in	readmission	
practice.	
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Table 1.	The	implementation	of	readmission	agreements	between	
the	EU	and	the	Eastern	Partners	
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Total
357
986
1428
3165
0
0
1
1
116
420
671
1601
98
451
518
1067
0
0
0
0
62
388
562
1406
0
0
2
2
ukraine
2008
2009
Total
695
1030
1725
680
495
1175
1209
1289
2498
40
82
122
0
23
23
1592
1545
3137
0
0
0
moldova
2008
2009
Total
217
225
680
0
0
0
134
111
483
28
23
51
0
3
3
456
446
1140
0
0
0
source*:	Evaluation	of	EU	Readmission	Agreements.	The	aggregated	data	for	
the	chosen	categories	gathered	by	the	European	Commission	from	the	MS	on	
a	basis	of	a	questionnaire,	Brussels,	23	February	2011,	SEC	(2011)	210.
*These	data	are	not	very	precise;	data	provided	by	 individual	member	 states	
are	at	variance,	not	all	countries	have	made	their	statistics	available	to	the	EC.	
No	data	have	yet	been	collected	for	2010,	when	readmission	agreements	came	
into	effect	in	the	full	scope.
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3. The region’s emigration potential
The	 demographic	 indicators	 in	 Eastern	 European	 countries	 are	
far	from	optimistic.	The	societies	of	our	eastern	neighbours,	in-
cluding	Russia,	are	characterised	by	low	fertility	rates	and	high	
mortality	rates,	and	are	ageing	fast.	Since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	
the	Russian	Federation	was	the	only	post-Soviet	state	to	have	seen	
a	substantial	increase	in	migration,	which	did	not	however	allow	
it	to	reverse	the	trend	of	its	decreasing	population.	The	forecasts	
for	 the	demographic	development	of	 this	region	 indicate	clearly	
that	the	population	will	fall	in	each	of	the	countries	discussed	de-
spite	the	fact	that	over	the	past	twenty	years	the	economic	situa-
tion	has	improved,	thet	life	expectancy	has	been	increasing,	the	
mortality	 rate	 has	 been	 falling,	 and,	 additionally,	 the	 fertility	
rates	improved	in	2005–2010.	The	countries	discussed	are	increas-
ingly	wary	of	the	threat	emigration	poses,	given	the	unfavourable	
demographic	situation.	Therefore,	they	are	slowly	embarking	on	
active	migration	policies.	All	this	means	that	no	significant	emi-
gration	wave	from	Eastern	Europe	to	the	EU	should	be	expected	
in	the	long	term.
However,	 it	 cannot	 be	 ruled	 out	 that	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 after	
a	 possible	 lifting	 of	 the	visa	 requirement,	migration	 from	East-
ern	European	countries	to	the	EU	will	grow.	This	trend	could	be	
observed	in	the	case	of	the	Western	Balkan	countries,	where	the	
visa-free	regime	was	introduced	in	2009–2010.	The	problem	with	
unfounded	applications	for	refugee	status	submitted	by	citizens	of	
Serbia	and	Macedonia	was	especially	difficult	to	handle	for	such	
countries	as	Germany,	Sweden	and	Belgium.	These	were	predom-
inantly	persons	of	Roma	or	Albanian	origin	whose	economic	situ-
ation	in	their	home	countries	was	very	bad.
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Table 2.	Key	demographic	indicators	in	Eastern	European	countries	
state russia ukraine belarus moldova
Population	
number	2010	
(millions)
142.958 45.448 9.595 3.573
Fertility	rate	
2005–2010	(per	
1,000	residents)
11.4 10.4 10.7 12.3
Mortality	rate	
2005–2010	(per	
1,000	residents)
14.2 16.7 14.4 13.5
Population	change	
ratio	2010–2015		
in	%	(medium	
variant)
-0.10 -0.55 -0.33 -0.68
source:	Population	Division	of	the	Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Affairs	
of	the	United	Nations	Secretariat.	World	Population	Prospects:	The	2010	Revi-
sion,	http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm
The	number	of	labour	migrants,	including	students	and	scholars	
from	Eastern	European	 countries	 (with	both	 regulated	and	un-
regulated	 status),	 staying	 in	 EU	member	 states	 is	 considerable	
and	reaches	several	million.	However,	it	is	very	difficult	to	assess	
their	number	with	even	rough	precision,	because	Eastern	Euro-
pean	 countries	 –	usually	 for	financial	 reasons	 –	 do	not	 conduct	
comprehensive	research	on	 labour	migration,	and	often	use	the	
simple	 formula	 of	 the	border	 crossing	balance.	The	most	meth-
odologically	 reliable	 research	 concerning	 Ukrainian	 migrants,	
which	was	conducted	by	 the	State	Statistics	Committee	 in	2008	
with	support	from	the	international	community,	revealed	that	1.5	
million	of	Ukraine’s	residents,	which	accounted	for	5.1%	of	its	pop-
ulation	at	productive	age,	were	working	abroad	between	2005	and	
mid-2008.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	survey	proved	that	emigration	
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dynamics	was	falling:	in	2007–2008	it	was	15%	lower	than	in	the	
preceding	two	years10.
Well-developed	migration	practice	may	attract	new	migrants	or	
facilitate	circulatory	migration.	However,	in	contrast	to	the	West-
ern	Balkans,	for	which	the	EU	is	the	main	region	to	migrate	to,	in	
the	case	of	Eastern	Europe,	Russia	is	an	equally	important	desti-
nation.	According	to	estimates,	around	half	of	all	labour	migrants	
from	Ukraine	 and	Moldova	 leave	 for	Russia.	 This	 share	 is	 even	
higher	in	the	case	of	Belarusian	migrants11.
The	 EU	 member	 states	 which	 are	 the	 most	 popular	 among	 la-
bour	migrants	 (predominantly	 Ukrainians	 and	Moldovans,	 but	
also	more	and	more	often	Russians	and	Belarusians,	who	previ-
ously	rarely	participated	in	labour	migration	to	the	EU)	are:	Italy,	
Spain,	the	United	Kingdom,	Germany	and	France.	A	new	country	
which	 is	gaining	popularity	with	migrants	 from	Ukraine	 is	 the	
Czech	Republic12.	The	number	of	migrants	who	move	from	East-
ern	Europe	 to	 Poland	has	 also	 been	 increasing	 recently.	 This	 is	
certainly	an	effect	of	the	liberalisation	of	regulations	concerning	
the	employment	of	foreigners.
The	labour	emigration	of	Belarusians	is	a	new	phenomenon.	Due	
to	 the	unprecedented	economic	 crisis	 this	 country	 sustained	 in	
2011,	 Belarusians’	 real	 wages	 have	 halved	 from	 around	 US$500	
to	US$250.	This	is	a	new	trend,	and	thus	it	is	difficult	to	confirm	
by	statistical	data.	However,	both	independent	trade	unions	and	
the	Belarusian	authorities	confirm	the	outflow	of	highly	qualified	
10	 This	survey	was	conducted	by	the	Ukrainian	Centre	for	Social	Reforms	and	
the	State	Statistics	Committee,	with	support	from	the	Open	Ukraine	foun-
dation,	the	IOM	and	the	EBRD;	for	more	see:	Instytut	Demografii	ta	Sotsy-
alnykh	Doslizhen	NAN	Ukrainy,	Trudova	emigratsya	v	Ukraine,	Kyiv	2010;	
pp.	109–112.
11	 See:	S.	Zivert,	S.	Zakharov,	R.	Klinkholts,	 ‘Migratsionnye	rezervy	Rossii’,	
Demoscope Weekly,	29 August–11 September	2011.	
12	 Instytut	Demografii	ta	Sotsyalnykh	Doslizhen	NAN	Ukrainy,	op.cit;	Build-
ing	Migration	Partnership,	Ukraine: Extended Migration Profile 2011.	
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labour,	including	specialists	in	the	areas	of	construction	and	ma-
chine-building,	as	well	as	other	 industry	workers.	The	destina-
tion	for	this	wave	of	Belarusian	emigrants	is	Russia,	where	such	
specialists	 are	 in	 demand.	 What	 is	 also	 important,	 Belarusian	
employees	are	not	required	to	hold	any	work	permits	 in	Russia.	
Russian	sociology	centres	are	also	reporting	on	a	new	emigration	
wave	of	young	educated	Russians	–	predominantly	students	and	
young	businessmen	–	who	leave	for	the	USA	and	Western	Europe-
an	countries.	According	to	estimates	by	Sergei	Stepashin,	chair-
man	 of	 the	 Russian	 Accounts	 Chamber,	 1.25	 million	 Russians,	
mainly	young	people,	emigrated	from	the	Russian	Federation	be-
tween	2008	and	201013.	This	is	not	strictly	labour	migration.	The	
main	reason	these	people	are	leaving	is	not	to	find	jobs	but	rather	
because	 they	are	dissatisfied	with	 the	prospects	of	 the	develop-
ment	of	their	country,	the	political	situation,	corruption,	etc.	The	
outflow	of	this	category	of	people	is	more	of	a	problem	for	Russia	
than	for	the	countries	they	emigrate	to,	since	Russia	is	thus	losing	
young	and	educated	human	capital.
13	 http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=111681		
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iii. the state of play. the visa liberalisation 
process
As	at	the	end	of	2007	the	Schengen	area	was	enlarged	to	include	
the	new	EU	member	states,	European	countries	and	institutions	
decided	 to	 launch	 mechanisms	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 negative	
consequences	of	the	introduction	of	the	new,	more	restrictive	visa	
regime.	These	mechanisms	have	been	developing	and	evolving.	It	
can	be	stated	now,	after	several	years	of	their	functioning,	that	the	
Eastern	European	area	has	been	covered	with	a	tight	network	of	
liberalisation	agreements	and	 technical	 assistance	programmes	
on	 visas	 and	 migration	 (visa	 facilitation	 agreements,	 readmis-
sion	agreements,	local	border	traffic	agreements,	assistance	pro-
grammes	 covering	 mobility	 or	 integrated	 border	 management,	
visa	dialogue,	etc.).	However,	it	has	to	be	admitted	that	their	real	
impact	on	the	liberalisation	of	the	movement	of	people	between	
Eastern	 European	 countries	 and	 the	 EU	 is	 rather	 insignificant.	
The	 security	 logic	 and	 the	 fear	 of	 the	 influx	of	undesirable	mi-
grants	is	still	prevalent	in	the	EU	policy	over	the	desire	to	open	
up	to	the	people	from	these	countries,	to	fill	the	EaP	with	content,	
and	to	build	more	friendly	relations	with	the	Eastern	Partners.	In	
other	words,	the	paradigm	of	security	policy	is	stronger	than	the	
paradigm	of	foreign	policy	in	the	EU’s	approach	to	visa	issues	in	
the	East.
1. Ukraine and Moldova: the action plans
Ukraine	 and	 Moldova	 have	 to	 be	 singled	 out	 as	 the	 most	 ad-
vanced	countries	in	the	visa	liberalisation	process.	These	coun-
tries	wish	 for	 concluding	 association	 agreements	with	 the	 EU	
(Ukraine	officially	closed	the	negotiations	in	December	2011)	and	
are	 at	 the	first	 stage	of	 implementation	of	 the	Action	Plans	on	
Visa	Liberalisation	(VLAP),	the	ultimate	goal	of	which	is	to	lift	
the	visa	requirement	completely.	The	Action	Plan	on	Visa	Liber-
alisation	granted	to	Ukraine	in	November	2010	and	to	Moldova	
in	January	2011	is	strongly	reminiscent	of	the	Road	Maps	which	
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allowed	the	Western	Balkan	countries	to	gain	visa-free	entry	to	
the	EU	several	years	ago.	It	includes	conditions	concerning	doc-
ument	security	(including	biometrics),	 illegal	 immigration	(in-
cluding	readmission),	public	order	and	security,	external	rela-
tions	and	fundamental	rights.	However,	unlike	with	the	Balkan	
states,	the	plans	for	Ukraine	and	Moldova	divide	very	ambitious	
requirements	necessary	to	be	met	 into	two	phases.	They	make	
a	distinction	between	the	requirements	linked	to	the	introduc-
tion	of	necessary	legal	changes	and	the	preparation	of	reforms	
and	 the	 requirements	 related	 to	 the	 direct	 implementation	 of	
such	reforms.	The	action	plans	for	Ukraine	and	Moldova	contain	
another	new	element,	namely	 the	provision	 that	 in	parallel	 to	
the	evaluation	of	the	reform	process,	the	liberalisation’s	poten-
tial	impact	on	the	situation	in	the	area	of	illegal	migration	in	the	
EU	will	 also	 be	 evaluated.	Naturally,	 such	 construction	 of	 the	
document	proves	that	the	assessment	of	the	eventual	progress	to	
be	made	by	Kyiv	and	Chisinau	predominating	in	Brussels	is	less	
optimistic.	 This	 also	 hints	 that	 the	 visa	 lifting	 process	 in	 this	
case	could	be	slower14.
The	staunchest	 supporters	of	 the	 introduction	of	a	visa-free	 re-
gime	with	Ukraine	and	Moldova	in	the	EU	are	Poland	and	other	
new	EU	member	 states	 (including	Romania	 in	 the	 case	 of	Mol-
dova).	These	 countries	believe	 that	 lifting	 the	visa	 requirement	
for	the	citizens	of	Eastern	European	countries	is	the	best	way	to	
promote	contacts	between	people	and	the	development	of	demo-
cratic	 societies.	A	 similar,	 albeit	 slightly	 toned	 down,	 approach	
has	been	taken	by	the	foreign	ministries	of	Sweden	and	Germany,	
and	business	circles	in	numerous	EU	member	states.	The	South-
ern	European	countries	are	relatively	indifferent,	although	they	
emphasise	 that	 the	 southern	direction	 should	 be	 given	priority	
in	the	development	of	the	neighbourhood	policy.	However,	most	
interior	ministries	 of	 the	 ‘old’	 EU	member	 states	 (especially	 of	
14	 In	the	case	of	the	Western	Balkan	countries,	it	took	between	two	and	three	
years	on	average.	
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Germany,	Austria	 and	Holland)	oppose	 lifting	 the	visa	 require-
ment	for	Eastern	European	countries	in	the	short	term,	and	their	
arguments	include	the	crisis	in	the	EU’s	migration	policy	and	the	
threats	posed	by	Eastern	Europe.
In	February	 2012,	 the	European	Commission	presented	 the	 sec-
ond	consecutive	reports15	which	evaluate	Ukraine’s	and	Moldova’s	
advancement	in	the	implementation	of	the	Action	Plans	on	Visa	
Liberalisation.	Although	 some	progress	 in	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 the	
plan’s	provisions	(especially	in	the	case	of	Moldova)	was	noted	in	
the	reports,	the	European	Commission	did	not	invite	the	partner	
states	 to	enter	 the	 second	 (implementation)	phase	of	 the	Action	
Plans.	This	means	that	Ukraine	and	Moldova	will	still	remain	in	
the	phase	of	preparations	 for	VLAP	 implementation.	Moving	 to	
the	 second,	more	 difficult,	 phase	 of	 Action	 Plan	 fulfilment	will	
thus	not	be	ruled	out	in	the	second	half	of	2012,	provided	that	both	
countries	have	adopted	all	 the	 required	 legislation	changes.	Al-
though	these	two	countries	have	been	treated	as	a	‘tandem’	so	far,	
it	is	possible	that	only	Moldova	will	be	invited	to	the	second	phase	
if	Ukraine	still	has	such	serious	delays	in	introducing	biometrics.	
On	 the	other	hand,	Moldova	poses	a	higher	migration	 risk,	 one	
proof	 of	which	 is	 the	 relatively	high	 rate	 of	 visa	 refusals	 at	 the	
consulates	of	Schengen	states.
While	the	visa	action	plans	can	be	recognised	as	the	main	element	
of	 the	visa	 liberalisation	dialogue	with	the	EU,	the	visa	facilita-
tion	agreements	in	force	since	2008	are	the	basic	real	instrument	
for	action	in	this	area.	Their	main	consequence	was	the	reduction	
in	the	price	of	the	short-term	uniform	(‘Schengen’)	visa	from	60	
to	35	euros,	offering	facilitations	in	obtaining	multiple-entry	vi-
sas	with	long	term	of	validity	to	selected	categories	of	travellers	
and	extending	the	range	of	situations	when	no	charges	for	visas	
are	made.	Since	the	agreements	came	into	force,	they	have	been	
monitored	by	non-governmental	organisations.	In	their	opinion,	
15	 The	first	evaluation	was	made	in	September	2011.	
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the	 consuls	 of	 the	Schengen	 countries	have	offered	 the	 facilita-
tions	 available	 too	 rarely,	 have	 issued	 too	 few	 long-term	 visas	
and	have	required	the	applicants	to	attach	an	excessive	number	
of	documents	 to	 each	visa	application,	 seeing	every	 traveller	as	
a	potential	illegal	migrant16.	The	latest	reports	still	note	a	certain	
improvement	in	the	situation,	including	an	increase	in	the	num-
ber	of	multiple-entry	visas	with	long	term	of	validity	and	free-of-
charge	visas	 issued17.	Furthermore,	 the	EU	Visa	Code	came	 into	
force	in	April	2010,	one	of	the	results	of	which	is	that	the	holders	
of	national	visas	of	Schengen	states	have	been	allowed	to	 travel	
without	 restrictions	 across	 the	 whole	 area,	 and	 new	 solutions,	
more	friendly	for	travellers,	have	been	introduced	to	the	visa	pro-
cedure.
Ukraine	 is	 negotiating	 a	 second-generation	 visa	 facilitation	
agreement.	 At	 the	 EU-Ukraine	 summit	 in	 December	 2011,	 the	
two	sides	closed	the	talks	on	the	envisaged	amendments	to	the	
liberalisation	agreement.	They	will	include	an	extension	of	the	
categories	of	individuals	authorised	to	receive	free-of-charge	vi-
sas	with	 long	 term	of	validity	 (to	 include	 for	example	workers	
of	non-governmental	 organisations)	 and	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	
special	charge	(70	euros)	for	issuing	a	visa	with	an	express	pro-
cedure	 applied.	 However,	 the	 greatest	 liberalisation	 impact	 is	
likely	to	be	made	by	the	new	provision,	according	to	which	mul-
tiple-entry	visas	are	to	be	issued	for	a	period	of	between	one	and	
five	years	and	not	of	up	to	one	or	up	to	five	years	as	has	been	the	
16	 See	 for	 example:	 Europe	 without	 Barriers,	 Public	 Monitoring	 of	 the	 EU	
Member	States’	Visa	 Issuance	and	Policies	and	Practices	 in	Ukraine,	Kyiv	
2009;	 Stefan	 Batory	 Foundation,	 Zmiany	w	polityce	wizowej	 państw	UE.	
Raport	z	monitoringu,	Warsaw	2009;	Stefan	Batory	Foundation,	“Gateways	
to	Europe”	–	a	Friendly	Border,	Warsaw	2009.	
17	 Europe	without	Barriers,	Schengen	Consulates	in	Assessments	and	Ratings.	
Visa	Practices	of	the	EU	Member	States	in	Ukraine,	Kyiv	2010;	A.	Stiglmay-
er,	 Liberalizacja	 reżimu	wizowego	wobec	 Państw	 Bałkanów	Zachodnich.	
Doświadczenia	i	wnioski,	Warsaw	2011.	
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case	so	 far.	 It	 is	expected	 that	 the	new	regulations	could	come	
into	force	in	the	second	half	of	201218.
Ukraine	is	the	only	neighbouring	state	to	have	local	border	traf-
fic	 (LBT)	agreements	 in	effect	on	 its	 almost	all	western	borders	
with	 the	 EU	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 border	 with	 Romania).	
These	 agreements	have	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	most	 efficient	 visa	
liberalisation	instrument	so	far.	They	have	considerably	activat-
ed	the	movement	of	people	between	the	new	Schengen	states	and	
Ukraine,	 and	have	 brought	 insignificant	 negative	 consequences	
(a	marginal	number	of	regime	violation	cases)19.	Although	a	level	
equal	to	that	in	2007,	when	Poland	was	not	a	member	state	of	the	
Schengen	area,	has	not	been	achieved	 in	 the	movement	of	peo-
ple	between	Poland	and	Ukraine,	local	border	traffic	has	had	the	
greatest	impact	on	improving	its	dynamics.	Over	7.5	million	bor-
der	crossings	were	registered	as	part	of	local	border	traffic	on	the	
Polish-Ukrainian	border	between	July	2009	(when	the	agreement	
came	into	force)	and	the	end	of	September	2011	(for	comparison:	
the	total	annual	number	of	crossings	on	this	border	is	 less	than	
15	million).
Moldova	neighbours	only	one	EU	member	 state,	Romania,	with	
which	it	has	signed	a	local	border	traffic	agreement.	However,	Mol-
dovans	enjoy	quite	a	broad	access	to	this	country.	Firstly,	Romania	
still	does	not	belong	to	the	Schengen	area,	so	its	visa	requirements	
can	 be	more	 liberal.	 Secondly,	 it	 is	 conducting	 an	 active	 policy	
aimed	at	granting	citizenship	to	individuals	of	Romanian	origin,	
who	–	according	to	its	definitions	–	are	descendants	of	citizens	of	
Romania	even	in	the	second	and	third	generations.
18	 See:	 European	 Union	 Factsheet,	 EU-Ukraine	 Summit	 (Kiev,	 19	 December	
2011);	Uhoda	pro	sproshcheniya	oformleniya	viz:	sho	novogo[not	‘shcho	no-
voho’?,	Yevropa	bez	barieriv,	26	December	2011.			
19	 See:	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament	and	
the	Council,	Second	report	on	the	implementation	and	functioning	of	the	lo-
cal	border	traffic	regime	set	up	by	Regulation	No.	1931/2006,	Brussels	9	Feb-
ruary	2011,	COM	(2011)	41	final.	
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Table 3.	Local	Border	Traffic	(LBT)	agreements	
lbt in force lbt under negotiation
ukraine With	Poland		
(since	July	2009)
With	Hungary		
(since	January	2008)
With	Slovakia		
(since	September	2008)
With	Romania	(at	an	early	negoti-
ating	stage)
belarus
With	Lithuania	(signed	in	Octo-
ber	2010;	ratification	has	been	
delayed)
With	Latvia	(signed	
in	August	2010;	came	
into	force	in	Febru-
ary	2012)
With	Poland	(signed	in	Febru-
ary	2010;	ratification	has	been	
delayed)
moldova With	Romania	(since	
September	2010)
russia
With	Norway	(signed	in	August	
2010;	will	come	into	force	most	
likely	in	mid-2012)
With	Poland	(the	entire	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast;	signed	on	14	Decem-
ber	2011;	planned	to	come	into	
force	in	mid-2012)	
With	Latvia	(at	the	level	of	the	
exchange	of	working	documents)
With	Lithuania	(at	the	level	of	the	
exchange	of	working	documents)	
source:	Developed	by	the	author	of	this	paper
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Moldova	has	the	best-developed	co-operation	with	the	EU	in	the	
area	of	migration	when	compared	to	other	countries	covered	by	
the	Eastern	Partnership.	It	also	benefits	from	numerous	assistance	
mechanisms	offered	as	part	of	the	European	Neighbourhood	Pol-
icy	(ENP).	Additionally,	it	participates	in	the	Partnership	for	Mo-
bility,	which	is	aimed	at	supporting	the	legal	and	structured	mi-
gration	of	Moldovans	to	EU	member	states20.	The	European	Union	
is	also	helping	Moldova	to	prepare	its	‘migration	profile’,	a	reform	
of	migration	 statistics	 in	 line	with	EU	 standards.	 Furthermore,	
as	part	of	the	EaP,	both	Ukraine	and	Moldova	are	participating	in	
a	project	aimed	at	improving	their	migration	management	capac-
ity	within	the	framework	of	‘Comprehensive	Institution	Building’	
(CIB).	These	two	countries	are	also	active	participants	of	the	flag-
ship	initiative	for	integrated	border	management,	and	they	have	
concluded	 (or	 are	 negotiating)	 co-operation	 agreements	 with	
Frontex,	Europol	and	Eurojust.	The	EU	Border	Assistance	Mission	
to	Moldova	and	Ukraine	(EUBAM)	offers	help	in	the	management	
of	the	Ukrainian-Moldovan	border	(at	the	Transnistrian	section	
which	is	beyond	Chisinau’s	control)21.
2. Russia: a separate ‘path’
Citizens	of	Russia	have	been	given	similar	visa	facilitations	in	the	
EU	 to	 Ukrainians	 and	Moldovans.	 A	 visa	 facilitation	 agreement	
has	been	applicable	in	EU-Russia	relations	since	2007,	as	a	conse-
quence	of	which	the	price	of	the	short-stay	visa	has	been	reduced	to	
35	euros	and	numerous	privileges	in	access	to	visas	with	long	term	
of	 validity	 have	 been	 granted	 to	 certain	 categories	 of	 travellers.	
Like	Ukraine,	Russia	is	negotiating	with	the	European	Commission	
amendments	 to	 this	 agreement	 to	 broaden	 the	 group	 of	 persons	
20	 The	two	other	Eastern	Partners	which	are	also	benefiting	from	this	mecha-
nism	are	Georgia	and	Armenia.	
21	 For	more	see:	Communication	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament,	
the	 Council,	 the	 European	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Committee	 and	 the	 Commit-
tee	of	the	Regions,	On	Cooperation	in	the	Area	of	Justice	and	Home	Affairs	with	
the	Eastern	Partnership,	Brussels,	26	September	2011,	COM	(2011)	564	Final.	
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encompassed	by	the	visa	facilitation.	However,	in	practical	terms,	
Russians	seem	to	be	in	a	better	situation	because	the	Schengen	con-
sulates	see	them	as	attractive	tourists.	Thus	the	number	of	visa	re-
fusals	in	Russia	is	lower	than	in	the	other	Eastern	European	coun-
tries.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Russian	Federation	is	perceived	in	the	
EU	through	the	prism	of	the	large	wave	of	refugees	and	irregular	
migrants	from	the	Northern	Caucasus,	which	swept	across	Europe	
in	the	aftermath	of	the	Chechen	conflict	(Russia	is	the	second	coun-
try,	after	Afghanistan,	in	terms	of	the	number	of	asylum	seekers	in	
the	EU).	Attention	is	also	paid	to	the	threats	of	religious	extremism	
and	terrorism.	Of	equal	importance	is	the	fact	that	the	number	of	
visas	 issued	in	Russia	by	the	consulates	of	Schengen	states	 is	the	
largest	in	the	world,	which	yields	considerable	incomes	and	is	not	
making	EU	countries	inclined	to	abolish	the	visa	regime.
Table 4.	Visa	statistics	of	the	Schengen	member	states	in	Eastern	
European	countries	in	2010
State
Number	of	all	
visas	issued	
(A,	B,	C,	LTV,	
D	and	‘D+C’)
Number	of	
Schengen	
visas	issued	
(A,	B	and	C)
Number	
of	nega-
tive	visa	
decisions	
(uniform	
visas)
Visa	re-
fusal	rate	
(uniform	
visas)
russia 4,525,985 4,479,220 56,868 1.41%
ukraine 1,227,001 1,061,311 37,916 3.69%
belarus 595,630 471,876 4,580 1.35%
moldova 198,704 179,605 13,345 10.82%
source:	Developed	by	the	author	on	the	basis	of	information	from	the	EC.	Source:	
http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/policies/borders/borders_visa_en.htm
explanations:	Visas:	‘A’	–	airport	transit	visa;	‘B’	–	transit	visa	(liquidated);	
‘C’	–	uniform	short-stay	visa;	‘D’	–	national	long-stay	visa;	‘D+C’	–	national	
long-stay	visa	valid	concurrently	as	a	short-stay	visa	(liquidated);	‘LTV’	–	spe-
cial	limited	territorial	validity	visa.
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Table 5.	Major	countries	of	origin	of	asylum	seekers	in	the	EU27	
in	2009–2010
2010 2009 change  2010 to 2009
ranking
2010 to 2009 
change
total num-
ber of ap-
plications
258,945 263,990 -5,045 -1.9% - - -
afghani-
stan 20,590 20,455 135 0.7% 1 1 0
russia 18,590 20,110 -1,520 -7.6% 2 2 0
serbia 17,745 5,460 12,285 225% 3 16 +13
iraq 15,800 18,845 -3,045 -16.2% 4 4 0
somalia 14,355 19,000 –	
4,645
-24.4% 5 3 -2
Kosovo 14,310 14,275 35 0.2% 6 5 -1
iran 10,315 8,565 1,750 20.4% 7 9 +1
pakistan 9,180 9,925 -745 -7.5% 8 8 0
… … … … … … … …
belarus 910 945 -35 -3.8%
ukraine 825 935 -110 -13.3%
moldova 735 1110 -375 -49.7%
source:	Eurostat
EU-Russia	relations	in	the	area	of	visa	liberalisation	have	a	spe-
cial	logic.	For	prestige	reasons,	it	was	unacceptable	for	Russia	to	
be	 subject	 to	 the	 conditionality	 principle,	 which	 other	 Eastern	
European	countries	agreed	to.	This	means	that	Moscow	will	not	
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implement	any	thorough	reform	programme	in	the	area	of	justice	
and	home	affairs	in	exchange	for	a	promise	from	the	EU	to	abolish	
the	visa	regime.	The	attitude	Russia	is	clinging	to	is	that	mutual	
visa	relations	should	be	regulated	by	 the	principle	of	mutuality	
and	therefore,	unlike	Ukraine	and	Moldova,	it	has	not	lifted	the	
visa	requirement	for	citizens	of	EU	member	states.	Furthermore,	
they	must	undergo	many	additional	procedures	 in	Russia,	 such	
as	filling	in	a	‘migration	card’	on	the	border	and	registering	their	
residence	in	the	place	of	stay	(if	their	stay	exceeds	7	days).
Formally,	the	introduction	of	a	visa-free	regime	between	the	EU	
and	Russia	has	been	stated	as	an	objective	to	be	achieved	in	almost	
every	document	signed	by	the	two	parties	since	2003.	However,	
more	practical	aspects	started	to	be	raised	in	talks	only	in	2010.	In	
December	2011,	the	two	parties	managed	to	agree	on	the	content	
of	their	common	road	map	entitled	‘Common	Steps	towards	visa-
free	short-term	travel	for	Russian	and	European	citizens’22.	This	
document,	which	has	been	modelled	on	the	visa	action	plans	for	
the	Balkan	states	and	Ukraine,	lists	the	obligations	of	the	two	par-
ties.	It	must	be	accepted	both	by	EU	member	states	and	by	Russia	
and	this	fact	is	making	its	implementation	more	difficult.
It	is	worth	keeping	in	mind	that	the	stances	adopted	by	individ-
ual	EU	member	states	and	also	individual	ministries	(foreign	vs.	
interior)	 or	 groups	 of	 interest	 (business	 circles	 are	more	 open)	
in	 a	 given	EU	member	 state	on	 lifting	 the	visa	 requirement	 for	
Russians	are	strongly	polarised.	The	predominant	opinion	in	the	
Scandinavian	and	the	Baltic	states	is	that	visa-free	entry	to	the	EU	
should	not	be	offered	to	officials	of	a	country	which	violates	hu-
man	rights.	The	interior	ministries	of	such	countries	as	Germany,	
Belgium	or	Holland	fear	an	influx	of	migrants	from	the	Northern	
Caucasus.	The	South	European	states,	 including	Spain	and	Por-
tugal,	 and	 the	 Central	 European	member	 states	 generally	 take	
a	more	 liberal	approach	to	visa	 issues	(although	they	would	not	
22	 European	Union	background,	EU-Russia	Summit,	Brussels,	15	December	2011.	
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like	Russia	to	outpace	Ukraine	or	Moldova	in	this	field).	In	turn,	
the	foreign	ministries	of	Germany	and	France	see	visa-free	move-
ment	 as	 a	 price	worth	 paying	 for	 closer	 political	 and	 economic	
relations	 with	 Russia.	 In	 November	 2011,	 France	 and	 Germany	
made	 an	 announcement	 stating	 that	 the	 EU	 should	 embark	 on	
negotiations	on	a	visa-free	regime	with	Russia	regardless	of	the	
fact	that	this	might	send	negative	signals	to	Eastern	Partnership	
countries23.
Special	rules	applied	to	the	negotiations	on	local	border	traffic	to	
be	 introduced	 in	 the	Kaliningrad	 enclave.	 Pursuant	 to	 the	pro-
posal	 stated	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	
the	Council	of	July	2011,	the	LBT	agreement	between	Russia	and	
Poland	–	as	has	not	been	the	case	with	the	other	frontier	areas	–	
will	not	be	restricted	to	a	30	to	50	kilometres	wide	border	zone.	
Instead,	it	will	cover	the	entire	Kaliningrad	Oblast	and	significant	
parts	of	 the	Polish	Pomeranian	and	Warmia-Mazury	provinces,	
including	Gdańsk,	Gdynia,	Elbląg	and	Olsztyn24.	The	agreement	
was	concluded	by	the	foreign	ministers	of	Poland	and	Russia	 in	
December	201125.	 It	 still	needs	 to	be	 ratified,	and	may	come	 into	
force	 in	 summer	 2012	 at	 the	 earliest.	 This	 special	 agreement,	
which	goes	beyond	Schengen	 legislation,	 is	generally	 supported	
by	the	Russian	government	and	at	the	same	time	is	giving	rise	to	
fears	 that	 decentralist	 tendencies	 could	 emerge	 in	 the	 enclave.	
Moscow	emphasises	that	Russia’s	priority	is	not	a	special	regime	
for	Kaliningrad	offering	privileges	to	its	residents,	but	a	visa-free	
23	 See:	‘EU	preparing	to	launch	visa-free	talks	with	Russia’,	EU Observer,	15	No-
vember	2011.
24	 Proposal	 for	 a	Regulation	 of	 the	European	Parliament	 and	of	 the	Council	
amending	Regulation	(EC)	No	1931/2006	as	regards	the	inclusion	of	the	Ka-
liningrad	 area	 and	 certain	 Polish	 administrative	 districts	 in	 the	 eligible	
border	area,	Brussels	27.07.2011,	COM		(2011)	461	final.	
25	 Agreement	on	the	Principles	of	Local	Border	Traffic	between	the	Govern-
ment	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	and	the	Government	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion,	signed	on	14	December	2011.	
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movement	 for	 all	 Russian	 citizens26.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Lithu-
anian	government	is	at	the	moment	not	ready	to	sign	an	equally	
ambitious	local	border	traffic	agreement,	arguing	that	this	would	
significantly	raise	the	risk	of	smuggling.	Besides	this,	the	Lithu-
anian	 government	 is	 feeling	 disaffected	with	 negotiations	with	
Russia	after	Moscow	broke	off	 the	almost	finalised	 talks	on	 the	
LBT	in	2009.
3. Belarus: at the very end
Belarus	comes	last	of	all	in	legal	and	formal	terms.	Not	only	has	it	
not	signed	a	visa	facilitation	agreement	but	it	has	not	even	adopted	
the	basic	documents	to	regulate	its	relations	with	the	EU,	includ-
ing	the	Partnership	and	Co-operation	Agreement	(PCA).	The	rati-
fication	of	this	document	was	withheld	in	1997	by	the	Belarusian	
side.	The	warming	of	Belarus-EU	relations	in	late	2007/early	2008	
did	however	allow	Minsk	to	join	the	Eastern	Partnership	and	to	
participate	 in	 the	flagship	 initiative	 for	 integrated	border	man-
agement	and	cross-border	co-operation	programmes.
The	 Belarusian	 regime	 quashing	 the	 demonstration	 after	 the	
presidential	 election	 on	 19	December	 2010	 resulted	 in	 a	 cooling	
of	relations	between	Brussels	and	Minsk	and	saw	the	EU	impose	
visa	sanctions	on	almost	250	individuals	accused	of	human	right	
violations27.Nevertheless	the	EU	Council	in	early	2011	authorised	
the	European	Commission	to	start	negotiations	on	a	visa	facilita-
tion	agreement.	However,	now	that	 the	 level	of	mutual	political	
relations	 is	 reduced,	 talks	 are	 only	 possible	 at	 the	 expert	 level.	
Furthermore,	 the	 EU	would	 like	 to	 target	 its	 offer	 primarily	 at	
the	Belarusian	public	and	not	at	officials	or	politicians,	in	which	
the	Belarusian	regime	is	not	interested.	Therefore,	it	seems	quite	
26	 ‘Vladimir	Putin	opposes	visa	 facilitation	for	 the	Kaliningrad	oblast’,	East-
Week,	8	June	2011.	
27	 This	list	has	been	extended;	initially	it	included	150	officials,	journalists	and	
businessmen.		
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unlikely	that	a	visa	facilitation	agreement	with	this	country	will	
be	signed	 in	 the	 immediate	 future	 (especially	since	 it	 should	be	
accompanied	by	a	readmission	agreement,	which	requires	close	
co-operation	with	the	institutions	in	charge	of	state	security).
As	a	consequence	of	the	lack	of	a	visa	facilitation	agreement,	Bela-
rusians	still	have	to	pay	60	euros	for	the	‘Schengen’	visa.	Moreo-
ver,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	both	Poland	and	Lithuania	ratified	the	
local	border	traffic	agreements	with	Belarus,	Minsk	has	been	de-
laying	bringing	 them	 into	 force.	Meanwhile,	 an	LBT	agreement	
with	Latvia	was	put	into	effect	in	February	2012,	which	–	accord-
ing	 to	 the	Belarusian	 government	 –	 is	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 test	 for	 the	
possible	further	implementation	of	agreements	of	this	kind28.	It	is	
worth	noting	that,	given	the	geographic	layout,	Belarusians	could	
benefit	more	than	Ukrainians	from	such	agreements.	Some	of	Be-
larus’s	large	urban	centres,	such	as	Grodno	and	Brest,	are	located	
in	the	border	zone	and	their	residents	would	enjoy	the	privileges	
offered	by	the	LBT.	Nevertheless,	the	real	visa	situation	of	Belaru-
sians	has	improved	over	the	past	year.	Firstly,	this	is	an	effect	of	
the	general	changes	in	the	EU’s	visa	policy.	Secondly,	in	response	
to	the	repressions	after	the	presidential	election,	some	EU	mem-
ber	states,	including	Poland	and	Latvia,	lifted	the	charges	for	na-
tional	visas	for	Belarusians,	which	de facto	has	made	it	possible	for	
them	to	travel	without	paying	for	visas	across	the	entire	Schen-
gen	zone.	This	indicates	that	the	EU	member	states’	governments	
are	thus	trying	to	put	into	effect	their	policy	of	supporting	civil	
society	in	Belarus.
However,	 it	 seems	unlikely	 that	 EU	 countries	would	 be	 consid-
ering	 lifting	 the	visa	 regime	 for	Belarus	at	 the	moment.	This	 is	
prevented	primarily	by	the	freezing	of	mutual	relations,	the	low	
frequency	of	contacts	between	the	law	enforcement	institutions	
of	the	two	sides,	and	the	lack	of	mutual	trust.
28	 Belarus-Latvia	 small-scale	 border	 traffic	 to	 open	 1	 February	 2012,	 Belta,	
31	January	2012.
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Table 6.	Existing	mechanisms	for	dialogue	and	co-operation	in	
the	area	of	visa	liberalisation
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ukraine Ad-
vanced
Yes Yes Yes
Association	Agenda,	Visa	Action	
Plan,	CIB,	the	flagship	IBM	initi-
ative,	cross-border	co-operation,	
EUBAM,	advanced	technical	
assistance	programmes	(migra-
tion,	readmission,	border	man-
agement,	refugee	protection,	
human	trafficking),	readmission	
co-operation	and	operational	
co-operation	with	Frontex	and	
Europol
moldova Ad-
vanced
Yes Yes Yes
Association	Agenda,	Visa	Action	
Plan,	CIB,	Partnership	for	Mobil-
ity,	the	flagship	IBM	initiative,	
EUBAM,	advanced	technical	
assistance	programmes	(migra-
tion,	readmission,	border	man-
agement,	refugee	protection,	
combating	human	trafficking),	
readmission	co-operation	and	
operational	co-operation	with	
Frontex	and	Europol
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russia Ad-
vanced
Yes No No
Common	steps	towards	lift-
ing	the	visa	regime,	migration	
dialogue,	negotiations	on	special	
status	for	Kaliningrad,	limited	
readmission	and	cross-border	
co-operation,	limited	technical	
assistance	programmes	(com-
bating	irregular	migration	and	
human	trafficking,	and	refugee	
protection)	and	co-operation	
with	Frontex
belarus Frozen No No Yes
Expert	consultations	on	the	
visa	facilitation	agreement,	the	
flagship	IBM	initiative,	limited	
technical	assistance	and	cross-
border	projects	(developing	IT	
infrastructure	on	the	border,	
improvement	of	the	border	pro-
tection	system	at	the	Belaru-
sian-Ukrainian	section,	refugee	
protection,	combating	human	
trafficking)	and	co-operation	
with	Frontex
source:	Developed	by	the	author
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iv. the strengths and the weaKnesses  
of the neighbouring countries 
One	cannot	assess	the	readiness	of	Ukraine,	Moldova,	Russia	and	
Belarus	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 visa-free	 regime	with	 the	 EU	
only	from	a	technical	perspective,	which	to	a	great	extent	was	the	
case	with	 the	Western	Balkans.	 It	 is	 increasingly	 clear	 that	 the	
decision	to	lift	the	visa	requirement	will	be	influenced	by	both	the	
level	 of	 technical	 preparation	 and	 the	political	 evaluation.	 Fur-
thermore,	in	contrast	to	the	previous	visa	liberalisation	processes	
in	 the	 EU’s	 neighbourhood,	 this	 process	 is	 not	 linked	 to	 acces-
sion	policy,	and	its	outcome	is	uncertain.	This	still	does	not	mean	
that	the	neighbouring	countries	should	be	doing	nothing,	believ-
ing	that	not	much	really	depends	on	them.	On	the	contrary,	they	
should	not	only	prove	they	have	made	technical	progress	–	follow-
ing	the	‘more	for	more’	principle	which	is	increasingly	popular	in	
the	European	Union	–	they	should	also	take	active	political	steps	
to	convince	EU	member	states	that	lifting	the	visa	regime	is	in	the	
interest	of	both	parties.
1. Political will and activity
All	the	countries	discussed	(including	Belarus)	are	declaring	that	
the	lifting	of	the	visa	regime	in	relations	with	the	EU	is	an	issue	of	
high	priority	for	them.	The	most	convincing	seem	to	be	Ukraine	
and	Moldova,	which	have	unilaterally	lifted	the	visa	requirement	
for	EU	citizens	(Ukraine	in	2005	and	Moldova	in	2007)	and	which	
are	displaying	pro-European	aspirations	by	making	efforts	to	con-
clude	Association	Agreements	with	the	EU.	The	desire	to	achieve	
a	 visa-free	 regime	 is	 shared	 by	 all	 the	major	 political	 forces	 in	
these	two	countries.	In	turn,	the	Russian	government,	although	
unwilling	 to	make	unilateral	 visa	 concessions,	 has	 consistently	
sought	the	abolition	of	the	visa	regime	in	major	European	capitals.
Lifting	 the	 visa	 requirement	 for	 travellers	 to	 the	 EU	 is	 very	
clearly	supported	by	the	public	in	Moldova	and	Ukraine.	This	is	
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particularly	 important	 for	 Moldovan	 society,	 almost	 one	 third	
of	whom	work	in	EU	member	states.	Ukrainians,	especially	resi-
dents	of	western	Ukraine,	have	also	been	participating	in	labour	
migration	 schemes	with	 EU	 states	 or	 earning	 their	 living	 from	
cross-border	trade	for	years.	The	latter	is	also	typical	of	residents	
of	western	Belarus,	who	earn	on	the	differences	in	petrol	and	cig-
arette	prices	 in	 the	neighbouring	EU	countries.	A	similar	 trend	
can	also	be	observed	in	Kaliningrad	Oblast.,	For	residents	of	Rus-
sia	proper,	who	travel	to	the	EU	mainly	as	tourists	in	organised	
groups,	the	existence	of	a	visa-free	regime	is	not	so	vital.	Shop-
ping	in	the	neighbouring	EU	member	states	is	also	very	popular	
among	citizens	of	Russia,	Ukraine	and	Belarus.	Tourism	 is	 also	
gaining	in	significance.	However,	due	to	the	complicated	visa	pro-
cedure	in	the	Schengen	area,	the	preferred	destinations	are	usu-
ally	Turkey	and	North	African	countries.
Each	of	the	countries	discussed	has	adopted	a	different	tactic	in	
dealing	with	the	EU.	Ukraine	has	generally	been	undergoing	re-
forms	in	line	with	the	EU’s	recommendations,	but	is	also	emphasis-
ing	its	great	geopolitical	significance	and	its	role	as	a	buffer	which	
protects	the	EU	from	undesirable	immigrants	from	the	East.	It	has	
been	delaying	the	implementation	of	those	reforms	which	would	
upset	 its	 institutional	 and	 bureaucratic	 status quo	 or	which	 re-
quire	too	radical	changes	of	the	system.	However,	it	co-operates	
closely	in	combating	illegal	migration,	understanding	that	this	is	
the	most	important	practical	 issue	for	the	EU.	Moldova	is	top	of	
the	class	as	regards	the	scope	of	the	reforms	implemented	and	the	
degree	of	acceptance	of	 the	solutions	proposed	by	 the	EU.	How-
ever,	it	has	problems	with	financing	and	personnel,	and	its	rate	of	
transformation	has	been	slowed	down	by	the	continuing	political	
crisis.	Furthermore,	the	level	of	visa	refusals	at	the	EU	consulates	
in	Moldova	is	also	very	high.	Chisinau’s	main	problem	is	the	un-
resolved	Transnistrian	conflict,	which	gives	rise	to	a	dilemma	as	
to	how	internal	security	can	be	guaranteed	in	the	country	in	line	
with	EU	standards	while	a	greater	openness	is	maintained	with	
regard	to	the	people	and	business	circles	of	Transnistria.
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So	far,	Russia	has	not	appeared	to	be	ready	to	make	serious	con-
cessions	to	the	EU	in	exchange	for	the	abolition	of	the	visa	regime	
or	the	introduction	of	a	real	principle	of	mutuality29.	Its	operation	
methods	 include	mainly	 appeals	 and	 diplomatic	 talks,	 and	 also	
influencing	 interest	 groups	 inside	 the	EU	which	are	 favourably	
disposed	 to	 it	 (business	 circles,	 the	 tourism	 industry	 and	 some	
politically	 friendly	governments).	However,	 the	 lengthy	stagna-
tion	in	relations	with	the	EU	and	the	increasingly	evident	system	
crisis	may	persuade	the	Russian	government	to	adopt	a	different	
tactic.	Belarus,	depending	on	the	political	phase	it	is	in	at	a	given	
moment,	is	either	threatening	the	EU	with	the	possibility	of	open-
ing	its	borders	and	thus	letting	in	a	huge	wave	or	illegal	migrants,	
or	 is	 emphasising	 the	high	 level	of	protection	of	 the	Belarusian	
border	and	its	stable	migration	situation.
Ukrainian	and	Moldovan	non-governmental	organisations	in	co-
operation	with	their	EU	counterparts	monitor	the	EU’s	visa	policy	
and	attract	 the	public	 opinion’s	 attention	 to	 the	 socio-economic	
problems	this	entails	 in	Eastern	European	countries.	They	ana-
lyse	the	tempo	and	the	character	of	the	reforms	conducted	by	their	
governments.	These	organisations	are	becoming	more	and	more	
professional	and	are	gaining	significance	as	a	pressure	group.	The	
same	applies	to	civil	society	organisations	in	Belarus,	which	are	
for	example	involved	in	the	lobbying	aimed	at	reducing	the	visa	
price	for	Belarusians	from	60	to	35	euros.	As	regards	Russia,	ap-
peals	for	visa	liberalisation	are	heard	rather	from	within	the	EU.	
One	proof	of	this	is	the	latest	report	from	the	Committee	on	East-
ern	European	Economic	Relations	(Ost-Ausschuss),	an	influential	
German	 business	 organisation	 which	 emphasises	 the	 benefits	
29	 For	 example,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2010,	 Russia	 introduced	 stricter	 visa	 require-
ments	for	citizens	of	Germany	in	response	to	what	it	believed	was	unfavour-
able	visa	practice	at	the	German	consulates	in	Russia,	as	a	consequence	of	
which	 the	number	of	Germans	visiting	Russia	has	 fallen	by	 considerably	
more	than	ten	percent.	
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business	world	would	derive	from	lifting	the	visa	requirement	for	
Russians30.
2. The rule of law and corruption
Difficulties	with	 introducing	the	rule	of	 law	are	 the	main	prob-
lem	all	the	countries	in	this	region	must	deal	with.	One	symptom	
of	this	is	a	judiciary	which	is	ineffective	and	also	far	from	being	
independent.	 The	 lack	 of	 respect	 for	 legal	 regulations	 and	 the	
principles	of	the	rule	of	law	makes	the	courts	either	susceptible	
to	political	influences	or	prone	to	corruption	by	business	circles.	
The	law	enforcement	authorities	and	the	judiciary	are	often	used	
in	political	clashes.	Although	the	criteria	linked	to	the	rule	of	law	
and	an	independent	judiciary	have	not	been	stated	expressis verbis	
in	the	Visa	Action	Plans,	stable	and	effective	judiciary	co-opera-
tion	in	criminal	matters	between	EU	member	states	and	Eastern	
European	countries	obviously	requires	a	major	reconstruction	of	
the	court	systems	in	these	countries.	However,	such	a	reconstruc-
tion	does	not	seem	to	be	placed	among	the	conditions	necessary	
to	be	met	for	a	visa-free	regime	to	be	introduced.	This	challenge	
is	too	complex	and	pertains	to	all	aspects	of	state	life,	so	it	should	
rather	be	seen	as	a	key	goal	of	the	association	agreements.
All	the	countries	discussed	also	have	problems	with	corruption.	
It	 is	 the	main	barrier	 in	 the	development	and	modernisation	of	
Ukraine	and	Russia.	Corruption	is	widespread	both	among	civil	
servants	and	state	administration	workers	–	whom	citizens	meet	
in	everyday	life	–	and	in	‘big	corruption’	where	politics	and	busi-
ness	 intermingle.	 As	 regards	 legislation,	Moldova	 and	 Ukraine	
are	the	leaders	in	terms	of	compliance	of	the	anti-corruption	laws	
with	EU	standards	and	participation	in	the	relevant	international	
instruments.	What	does	raise	some	doubts,	 though,	 is	 the	prac-
tical	 aspect:	 the	 operation	 of	 anti-corruption	 institutions	 and	
30	 Roads	to	Visa-free	Travel,	Position	Paper,	Committee	on	Eastern	European	
Economic	Relations,	July	2011.	
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the	 fulfilment	of	 these	countries’	practical	obligations	 resulting	
from	their	membership	in	the	Group	of	States	against	Corruption	
(GRECO).	Belarus	 started	 to	 co-operate	with	GRECO	only	at	 the	
beginning	of	2010,	so	it	is	difficult	to	evaluate	the	condition	of	its	
legislation	and	anti-corruption	practice.	According	to	the	GRECO	
report	on	 combating	 corruption	 in	 the	Russian	Federation	pub-
lished	in	late	2010,	Russia	by	then	implemented	9	of	the	26	recom-
mendations	from	this	organisation.	Russia’s	main	problems	were	
identified	as:	 the	non-transparent	financing	of	political	parties,	
and	bribery	in	the	judiciary	and	public	administration	system.
Another	key	problem	in	this	region	is	posed	by	the	unreformed	
and	non-transparently	managed	interior	ministries,	which	after	
all	should	be	performing	a	coordinating	function	in	the	process	of	
visa	liberalisation	and	carrying	out	the	necessary	reforms.	Even	
in	Ukraine	and	Moldova,	 the	ministries	of	 internal	affairs	have	
not	 undergone	 any	major	 changes	 and	 in	 fact	 are	 rather	 police	
ministries	than	civil	institutions	in	charge	of	the	supervision	of	
the	law	enforcement	agencies.
3. Biometric documents
The	 second	 progress	 report	 on	Moldova	 in	 the	 part	 evaluating	
the	 implementation	of	 legislative	changes	 in	the	area	of	biomet-
rics	stated	that	this	country	had	in	principle	met	the	conditions	
set	 in	 the	first	phase	of	 the	Action	Plan	on	Visa	Liberalisation31.	
The	Moldovan	Ministry	for	Information	Technology	and	Commu-
nications	has	been	issuing	biometric	documents	since	2008.	How-
ever,	it	was	only	at	the	beginning	of	2011	when	International	Civil	
Aviation	 Organization	 (ICAO)-compliant	 biometric	 documents	
became	the	only	type	of	passport	issued.	Moldova	has	a	complete	
electronic	population	 registration	 system	on	 the	basis	 of	which	
31	 Second	 progress	 report	 on	 the	 implementation	 by	 the	 Republic	 of	 Mol-
dova	 of	 the	 Action	 Plan	 on	 Visa	 Liberalisation,	 Brussels,	 9.2.2012,	 SWD	
(2012)	12	Final.	
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documents	are	issued32.	All	passports	are	to	be	replaced	with	bio-
metric	ones	by	2019.	However,	EU	experts	point	to	the	following	
two	 weaknesses	 of	 the	Moldovan	 system	 for	 issuing	 biometric	
documents:	the	chip	carrying	the	biometric	data	is	attached	and	
not	integrated,	and	children’s	names	are	still	written	in	the	pass-
ports	 of	 their	 parents33.	 Still	 the	main	 challenge	 the	Moldovan	
government	needs	to	cope	with	is	ensuring	the	security	of	issu-
ing	biometric	documents	to	residents	of	the	breakaway	region	of	
Transnistria	so	that	this	process	is	fair	and	transparent.
Ukraine	has	noticed	 significant	 delays	 as	 regards	 the	 introduc-
tion	 of	 biometric	 documents.	Not	 only	does	 it	 not	 issue	biomet-
ric	passports,	it	also	has	not	adopted	the	proper	legislation.	This	
is	not	an	effect	of	technological	or	financial	problems,	but	rather	
of	the	conflict	of	interests	over	the	shape	of	the	planned	reform.	
The	Ukrainian	president,	Viktor	Yanukovych,	vetoed	the	law	on	
documents	identifying	a	person	adopted	by	parliament	in	October	
2011,	which	has	delayed	the	 introduction	of	 the	necessary	 legis-
lative	 changes	 yet	 further.	 The	 official	 reason	 for	 the	 presiden-
tial	veto	was	the	law’s	non-compliance	with	the	constitution,	but	
some	experts	have	stated	off	the	record	that	this	law	would	have	
adversely	affected	the	interests	of	Ukrainian	citizens	and	would	
have	yielded	considerable	profits	to	a	company	which	is	the	only	
one	in	Ukraine	capable	of	producing	biometric	documents	in	com-
pliance	with	ICAO	standards34.	Another	major	problem	is	the	lack	
32	 First	 progress	 report	 on	 the	 implementation	 by	 the	 Republic	 of	Moldova	
of	 the	Action	 Plan	 on	Visa	 Liberalisation,	 Brussels,	 16.09.2011,	 SEC	 (2011)	
1075	Final.		
33	 Policy	Association	for	Open	Society,	“Belarus	Country	Report”.	Paving	the	
Road	towards	Visa-free	Travel	between	the	Eastern	Partnership	countries	
and	the	EU.
34	 The	government	adopted	another	version	of	the	bill	introducing	biometric	
passports	in	February	2011	(all	other	identity	documents	would	not	contain	
biometric	data).	
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of	 an	 automatic	 uniform	 system	 for	 population	 registration35.	
The	personal	data	protection	system	is,	however,	quite	advanced.
Russia	has	been	issuing	biometric	passports	since	2005	and	their	
newer,	 improved	version	since	2010.	Russia	also	 started	 issuing	
biometric	passports	on	a	mass	scale	only	in	2010	–	around	3	mil-
lion	of	these	documents	were	issued	during	one	year.	However,	the	
passports	currently	being	issued	do	not	meet	all	the	EU	standards.	
The	Federal	Migration	Service	has	announced	that	passports	with	
integrated	secured	biometric	chips	will	be	issued	starting	in	2013.
Belarus	has	not	introduced	biometric	passports	as	yet,	but	it	has	
the	proper	institutional	system	and	the	technologies	needed	to	do	
this.	They	were	developed	as	part	of	the	MIGRABEL	technical	as-
sistance	programme,	which	was	implemented	between	2007	and	
2009	by	the	International	Organization	for	Migration.	Belarus	is	
planning	to	supply	 its	border	checkpoints	with	adequate	equip-
ment	 capable	 of	 reading	 biometric	 documents	 and	 to	 begin	 is-
suing	biometric	passports	 to	 its	citizens	 in	2012.	Since	Minsk	 is	
not	engaged	in	a	visa	dialogue	with	the	EU,	the	system	for	issu-
ing	documents	containing	biometric	data	has	not	been	officially	
evaluated	by	EU	experts.
4. Border management 
Eastern	European	countries	are	at	various	levels	of	advancement	
as	 regards	 the	 development	 of	 the	 border	management	 system	
and	the	existing	border	challenges.	However,	beyond	any	doubt,	
they	have	all	conducted	a	more	or	 less	thorough	reform	of	their	
respective	 border	 surveillance	 systems	 by	making	 a	 transition	
from	a	purely	military	system	to	systems	based	on	police	troops.	
35	 First	progress	 report	of	 the	 implementation	by	 the	Ukraine	of	 the	Action	
Plan	on	Visa	Liberalisation,	Brussels,	16.09.2011,	SEC	(2011)	1076	Final;	Sec-
ond	progress	report	on	the	implementation	by	Ukraine	of	the	Action	Plan	on	
Visa	Liberalisation,	Brussels,	9.2.2012,	SWD	(2012)	10	Final.
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Border	management	in	these	countries,	especially	of	the	sections	
shared	with	 EU	member	 states,	 is	much	more	 efficient	 than	 in	
the	 1990s.	Nevertheless,	 there	are	still	 some	sections	which	are	
not	protected	either	for	political	reasons,	as	is	the	case	with	the	
Russian-Belarusian	 border	 (these	 two	 countries	 form	 a	 Union	
State),	or	due	to	logistical	and	financial	difficulties,	as	is	the	case	
with	the	world’s	longest	land	border	between	Russia	and	Kazakh-
stan.	In	turn,	the	Transnistrian	section	is	controlled	only	on	the	
Ukrainian	side.	Some	key	sections,	as	the	Ukrainian-Belarusian	
or	Ukrainian-Russian	borders	have	not	been	delimited	but	are	in	
practice	controlled	rather	effectively.
The	quality	of	technical	equipment	varies	immensely	between	in-
dividual	border	 sections.	Some	of	 them	have	cutting-edge	equip-
ment	at	their	disposal,	while	others	are	protected	with	the	use	of	
mobile	 patrols	 and	 a	 system	 of	 entanglements,	 ditches	 and	 bare	
land	strips,	called	sistema. Basic	risk	analysis	systems	have	already	
been	implemented	in	Ukraine	and	Moldova.	The	channels	for	in-
formation	 flow	 inside	 border	 services	 are	 insufficient	 in	 all	 the	
countries	in	this	region,	since	–	based	on	the	old	Soviet	models	–	the	
agencies	are	strongly	centralised,	and	the	internal	flow	of	informa-
tion	in	them	mainly	goes	top	down.	Furthermore,	inter-agency	co-
operation	channels	are	underdeveloped.	Border	and	customs	ser-
vices	often	do	not	have	mutual	access	to	their	respective	databases.	
This	means	that	although	both	Ukraine	and	Moldova	have	adopted	
the	integrated	border	management	strategy,	such	a	system	does	not	
exist	in	practice	in	any	of	the	states	discussed.
Ukraine	is	the	clear	leader	in	border	management.	Firstly,	it	quite	
effectively	controls	all	its	borders.	Secondly,	it	has	a	relatively	well-
reformed	and	appropriately	managed	border	police.	The	process	
of	its	transformation	from	a	military	structure	into	a	law	enforce-
ment	agency	is	almost	complete.	Moldova	is	still	not	as	advanced	
as	Ukraine	in	this	process	(although	its	legislation	complies	best	
with	EU	standards).	In	turn,	the	border	services	of	Russia	and	Be-
larus	are	 still	 at	 the	 initial	 stage	of	 reform.	Belarus	 controls	 its	
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borders	with	 the	 EU	 effectively	 (albeit	 in	 a	 paramilitary	 style),	
but	 it	 has	 not	 developed	 sufficient	 mechanisms	 for	 controlling	
travellers	who	enter	 the	country	 from	Russia.	Meanwhile,	Rus-
sia	made	an	interesting	experiment	by	removing	the	competences	
concerning	border	 infrastructure	development	 from	the	obliga-
tions	of	the	border	service,	which	reports	to	the	KGB,	and	creating	
a	modern	agency	in	charge	of	equipping	the	state	border.
5. The migration policy
All	the	countries	discussed	need	to	tackle	their	Soviet	legacy	in	the	
area	of	migration	policy,	one	characteristic	of	which	are	the	com-
bined	 competences	 covering	 the	 policy	 towards	 foreigners,	 con-
cerning	population	registration	and	citizenship	policy.	In	effect	of	
this,	migrants	are	perceived	mainly	through	the	prism	of	required	
documents	and	certificates,	with	no	link	being	made	to	the	needs	
of	 the	 labour	market.	 Generally,	 the	 immigration	 policy	 of	 each	
of	these	countries	needs	to	be	characterised	as	restrictive	and	bu-
reaucratised.	The	migrant	 labour	black	market	 exists	 (especially	
in	the	case	of	Russia)	due	to	the	impracticality	of	the	regulations	
rather	than	their	liberalism.	Despite	the	existence	of	vast	diasporas	
abroad,	emigration	policy	is	also	insufficiently	developed.	Asylum	
policy	should,	however,	be	basically	recognised	as	being	close	to	in-
ternational	standards,	especially	as	regards	the	legislative	aspect.
Legislation	 on	migration	 and	 asylum	 in	Moldova	 is	 the	most	 ad-
vanced	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	 best	 EU	 practices	 and	
standards.	 Still	 Chisinau	 needs	 to	 handle	 institutional	 problems	
related	to	the	coordination	of	migration	policy	and	also	control	of	
people	who	enter	Moldova	from	Transnistria.	After	many	years	of	
bureaucratic	perturbation,	the	Ukrainian	government	established	
the	State	Migration	Service	in	2010,	which	is	set	to	deal	with	most	of	
the	tasks	related	to	migration	policy,	and	then	adopted	the	national	
migration	strategy.	Another	positive	thing	was	parliament	adopt-
ing	 a	 new	 law	 on	 refugees	 and	 temporary	 protection.	 However,	
a	modern	law	on	foreigners	is	still	missing.	Ukraine	is	also	lacking	
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both	a	uniform	automated	database	on	foreigners	and	mechanisms	
for	collecting	statistical	data	on	migration.	Belarus	conducts	a	typi-
cally	post-Soviet	migration	policy,	where	emphasis	is	put	on	control	
and	registration	functions.	The	authority	in	charge	of	its	implemen-
tation	is	the	Ministry	of	Internal	Affairs.	The	most	modern	and	the	
closest	to	EU	practices	are	those	areas	of	migration	policy	(asylum	
policy	 and	 combating	human	 trafficking)	 in	which	 international	
technical	assistance	programmes	have	been	implemented.
Russia’s	migration	policy	is	difficult	to	compare	to	the	policies	of	
the	other	countries	in	this	region.	Russia	is	not	only	the	world’s	
largest	country	in	terms	of	territory	but	also	is	home	to	equally	
intensive	migration	movements	as	the	USA,	France	and	Germany,	
and	has	 equally	 serious	 problems	with	 integration.	Russia	 is	 at	
the	crux	of	immigrant	movements	in	the	CIS	area	–	it	accounts	for	
approximately	75%	of	the	migrants	from	this	region.	Since	the	col-
lapse	of	the	USSR,	Russia	has	accepted	around	7	million	migrants	
from	the	post-Soviet	area	as	permanent	residents,	and	between	
4	and	6	million	labour	migrants	are	working	in	Russia36.	Howev-
er,	the	Russian	Federation’s	migration	policy	is	rather	ineffective	
and,	above	all,	it	is	overly	focused	on	short-term	tasks.	On	the	one	
hand,	Russia	can	carry	out	vast	liberalisation	actions,	and	on	the	
other	it	can	soon	cancel	the	changes	adopted	when	this	is	need-
ed	for	internal	political	purposes.	What	gives	rise	to	the	greatest	
criticism	 are	 the	 annual	 immigration	 quotas,	 which	 are	 unad-
justed	to	the	labour	market	needs,	and	the	practice	of	modifying	
them	during	the	year.	The	authority	in	charge	of	the	supervision	
of	migration	policy	is	the	Federal	Migration	Service,	a	typical	po-
lice	 authority,	with	 complex	 control	 and	 registration	 functions.	
Russia	is	not	trying	to	adopt	the	EU’s	best	practices	and	standards,	
although	the	practices	adopted	 in	some	areas,	such	as	 the	read-
mission	policy	and	combating	human	trafficking,	are	very	close	
to	those	used	in	EU	member	states.
36	 V.	Mukomiel,	Rossiyskiye	diskursy	o	migratsii:	“nulevye	gody”,	Demoscope.
ru,	26	September–9	October	2011.	
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recommendations 
“to breaK the spell cast on visas”
general recommendations
•	 To	make	the	abolition	of	visas	in	relations	between	the	EU	and	
the	Eastern	European	countries	possible,	the	”spell” must be 
broken	on	this	issue.	With	the	present	levels	of	mobility	and	
people-to-people,	 business,	 political,	 etc.	 contacts	 between	
the	EU	and	Eastern	European	countries,	the introduction of 
a visa-free regime will be a natural consequence of the lib-
eralisation processes which have been at work for years.
•	 Firstly,	 the	visa-free	movement	 is not linked to enlarge-
ment policy, and	EU	member	states	need	not	fear	that	this	
will	give	rise	to	a	huge	wave	of	accession-related	demands	
from	the	partners.	In	turn,	this	will	certainly	help	stabilise	
the	EU’s	closest	neighbourhood	and	may	improve	the	public	
sentiments	in	the	neighbouring	countries,	which	tend	to	be	
increasingly	unappreciative	 of	 the	EU.	This	will	 also	 pro-
vide	an	 incentive	 for	Eastern	European	countries	 to	make	
the	effort	to	modernise	themselves.	The	free	movement	of	
people	is	also	the	best	conveyor	belt	to	transfer	EU	models	
and	practices	in	developing	entrepreneurship	and	self-gov-
ernance.
•	 Secondly,	the	decision	to	lift	the	visa	requirement	is unlikely 
to significantly stimulate an increase in migration pres-
sure from	Eastern	European	countries.	Citizens	of	the	coun-
tries	from	this	region	are	in	the	lead	in	global	statistics	of	visas	
granted	by	the	consulates	of	EU	states	anyway,	and	the	larg-
est	wave	of	 labour	emigration	 to	 the	EU	 took	place	a	decade	
ago.	An	increased	influx	of	people	seeking	to	be	granted	refu-
gee	status	unreasonably,	even	if	 this	happens,	 is	 likely	to	be	
temporary.	Besides	which,	there	are	methods	to	combat	this.	
The	EU	should	not	view	the	migration	flows	from	Africa	and	
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Eastern	Europe	in	the	same	light,	because	the	risk	of	migra-
tion	from	Eastern	Europe	is	continuously	falling.
•	 Thirdly,	although	the	consulates	of	 the	Schengen	states	gen-
erate	considerable	profits	on	the	numerous	visas	they	grant,	
the	present consular system in eastern europe is very ex-
panded (the	number	of	employees	and	the	maintenance	of	the	
buildings	and	infrastructure)	and therefore expensive. It	is	
worthwhile	considering	allocating	these	funds	to	the	protec-
tion	 from	 undesirable	 migration	 from	 Northern	 Africa	 and	
the	Middle	East,	since	this	could	turn	out	a	less	expensive	so-
lution.	Meanwhile,	a	less	expensive	but	equally	effective	solu-
tion	in	terms	of	meeting	the	conditions	necessary	to	guaran-
tee	safety	could	be	 the	use	of	biometric	passports	on	a	mass	
scale	in	Eastern	Europe.
•	 Fourthly,	 lifting	 the	visa	 requirement	 for	Eastern	European	
citizens	can be temporary and conditional, and	may	involve	
the	EU’s	latest	proposals	for	improving	migration	safety,	such	
as	the	‘smart	borders’	system	or	introducing	visa-free	entry	for	
periods	shorter	than	three	months.	This	policy	of	increased 
conditionality could	have	a	mobilising	effect	on	the	govern-
ments	of	Eastern	European	countries	and	thus	could	stimulate	
them	to	fulfil	their	obligations	with	regard	to	the	EU.
•	 In	political	terms,	making	visa	liberalisation	a	key	issue	would	
fundamentally	change	the	partners’	approach	to	the	eastern 
partnership and	would	provide	a	link	to	the	partnership for 
modernisation targeted	at	Russia.	An	eastern	policy	based	on	
the	model	of	importing	the	acquis and	EU	values	will	be	inef-
fective	if	such	standards	and	values	remain	a	purpose	per se. 
Meanwhile,	they	should	bring	the	governments	and	societies	
of	these	countries	closer	to	achieving	practical	goals,	such	as	
travel	facilitations,	for	instance.
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•	 The	technical	approach	is	prevalent	at	the	moment	in	the	visa	
dialogue	with	the	countries	covered	by	the	EaP.	The	European	
Union	is	rather	principled	as	regards	the	precise	fulfilment	of	
the	criteria	and	notices	too	little	the	political	potential	of	the	
negotiation	process.	In	turn,	in	the	case	of	Russia,	the	dialogue	
is	taking	place	first	of	all	for	political	purposes,	and	EU	officials	
seem	to	have	little	faith	in	Moscow’s	determination	to	imple-
ment	 reforms.	 It	 seems	 that	 in	both	cases	the golden mean 
should be found between technical issues and politics.
•	 From	the	point	of	view	of	security	and	politics,	the	best	solu-
tion	would	be	 to	grant	 the	visa-free	regime	to	ukraine and 
moldova at the same time or over a short time-span (pro-
vided	that	they	have	met	the	required	criteria).	It	would	be	dif-
ficult	to	introduce	a	visa-free	regime	with	Russia	at	the	same	
time	due	to	the	scale	of	this	country	and	the	need	to	apply	spe-
cial	regulations.	Ensuring	effective	border	surveillance	across	
entire	length	of	the	borders	or	stabilising	security	in	Northern	
Caucasus,	from	where	the	individuals	who	seek	refugee	status	
in	the	EU	originate,	will	certainly	take	many	years.	However,	
lifting the visa requirement for certain categories of trav-
ellers from russia, especially	bona fide	travellers,	business-
men	and	tourists	seems	to	be	very	realistic.	This	solution	may	
offer	considerable	political	and	financial	benefits	to	EU	mem-
ber	states	and	carries	a	low	migration	risk.
•	 The	 conditions	 necessary	 to	 be	 met	 before	 the	 visa	 regime	
is	lifted	is	the	achievement	of	a	satisfactory	level of mutual 
trust between law enforcement agencies of eu member 
states and the partner states, both	at	the	strategic	level	and	
in	everyday	operational	co-operation.	Even	if	it	is	impossible	
to	build	such	trust	today	in	relations	between	the	EU	and	Be-
larus,	minsk should not be excluded completely from the 
liberalisation process. Paradoxically,	 this	 country	 poses	
a	low	migration	risk,	and	the	relevant	Belarusian	institutions	
could	catch	up	quickly	during	the	negotiation	process.	In	the	
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short	term,	the	possibility	of	lowering	the	price	of	the	uniform	
visa	to	35	euros	without	the	need	to	sign	visa	facilitation	and	
readmission	agreements	should	be	considered.
detailed recommendations
•	 The	possibilities	of	a	conditional	and	temporary	introduction	
of	a	visa-free	regime	and	the	changes	necessary	to	be	made	for	
this	purpose	in	Schengen	legislation	need	to	be	analysed.	Pos-
sible	 solutions	could include lifting the visa requirement 
for citizens of a given country for a short period (for ex-
ample, at the time of holding a mass sports, cultural or 
religious event).	 Such	 a	 test phase would	make	 it	 possible	
to	check	the	operation	of	the	institutions	in	charge	of	border	
safety	and	the	expected	increase	in	the	dynamics	of	the	move-
ment	of	people.	Although	too	little	time	has	remained	for	this	
proposal	 to	 be	 possible	 to	 put	 into	 practice	 during	 the	 Euro	
2012	 football	 championship,	 some	 security	 solutions	 which	
could	be	used	 in	a	possible	 test	phase	of	 the	visa-free	move-
ment	could	be	tested	at	this	time.
•	 It	 is	 also	worth	considering	 lifting	 the	visa	 requirement	for 
specific categories of people (travellers who have had 
a positive visa history so far, businessmen, students and 
youth, individuals mentioned in visa facilitation agree-
ments, tourists), who	 pose	 a	 low	 migration	 risk	 and	 who	
could	offer	EU	member	states	considerable	economic	and	so-
cial	 benefits	 and	 promote	 EU	 models	 and	 standards	 in	 the	
countries	they	come	from.
•	 The	introduction	of	a	visa-free	regime	with	Eastern	European	
countries	does not need to entail an increase in the pressure 
migrants from eastern european countries put on the eu 
labour markets (which	does	not	seem	to	be	beneficial	during	
an	economic	slowdown).	It	is	worth	keeping	in	mind	that	these	
migrants	are	already	present	on	these	markets	anyway,	and	
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their	total	number	is	not	growing	but	falling.	Furthermore,	in	
a	visa-free	regime,	they	would	be	more	ready	to	seek	the	pos-
sibilities	of	legal	employment	in	EU	member	states.
•	 To	reduce	the	resistance	of	those	EU	member	states	which	op-
pose	the	introduction	of	a	visa-free	regime,	it	is	worth	consid-
ering	synchronising	the	decision	to	lift	the	visa	requirement	
with	 introducing	 other	 security	 measures	 in	 the	 Schengen	
Area,	 including	 the	 ‘smart	 borders’	 system,	 in particular 
the mechanism of registering travellers prior to their en-
try to the schengen area (provided	that	the	introduction	of	
these	 instruments	 is	not	excessively	delayed).	 It	may	also	be	
worthwhile	to	introduce	regulations	which	facilitate	the re-
instatement of temporary border control on	 the	 internal	
borders	should	 there	be	a	mass	 influx	of	migrants	or	a	 seri-
ous	organised	 crime	 threat37.	 Equally,	making	 the	 system	of	
transferring third states from the ‘white’ to the ‘black’ 
visa list more	flexible	could	be	considered.
•	 The	negotiation	process	cannot last too long. Otherwise,	the	
motivation	of	the	partner	states	to	launch	reforms	will	weak-
en	significantly,	and	the	dialogue	with	the	EU	will	be	viewed	
as	a	bureaucratic	exercise.
•	 The	 criteria	 necessary	 to	 be	 met	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	
groups:	 those	aimed	at	minimising	 the	risk	of	 illegal	migra-
tion	from	Eastern	European	countries	to	the	EU	following	the	
introduction	of	the	visa-free	regime,	and	those	which	should	
lead	to	internal	reforms	to	be	implemented	in	these	countries	
in	 line	with	EU	 standards	 and	values.	 it must be uncondi-
tionally ensured that the criteria from the first group 
37	 See:	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Regulation	of	the	European	Par-
liament	and	of	the	Council	amending	Regulation	(EC)	No	562/2006	in	order	
to	provide	for	common	rules	on	the	temporary	reintroduction	of	border	con-
trol	at	internal	borders	in	exceptional	circumstances,	Brussels,	16	Septem-
ber	2011,	COM	(2011)	560	Final.	
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have been met. the fulfilment of the criteria specified in 
the second category could be treated less rigorously. It	 is	
worth	considering	the	introduction	of	a	visa-free	regime	con-
ditionally,	 after	most	of	 the	 criteria	have	been	 fulfilled,	 and	
at	the	same	time	introducing	the	mechanism	for	monitoring	
further	progress.
•	 In	the	short	term,	the	most	important	issues	appear	to	be	the 
introduction of biometric documents, automatic popula-
tion registration systems and uniform databases at law 
enforcement agencies, and ensuring proper border man-
agement. In	the	long	term,	the	EU	should	insist	that	the min-
istries of internal affairs are reformed and the judiciary 
and the system for combating corruption are strength-
ened, and	it	should	treat	these	elements	as	an	inherent	part	of	
its	association	agenda	(with	regard	to	Ukraine	and	Moldova).	
In	the	cases	of	Russia	and	Belarus,	a	change of the restrictive 
residence registration policy applied	to	citizens	of	EU	mem-
ber	states	should	also	be	a	key	element.
•	 Incentive	for	reform	(for	example,	once	the	first	group	of	the	
criteria	as	part	of	the	action	plans	have	been	met)	could	also	
be	provided	by	amending	the	visa	facilitation	agreements	to	
cause	further	liberalisation.
•	 The	 regional co-operation on	migration	 and	 borders,	 pro-
moted	 by	 the	 EU,	 in	 this	 area	 is impossible without rus-
sia.	 If	 its	goals	also	 included	visa-free	movement	 for	Russia,	
a	breakthrough	could	be	more	easily	achieved	in	many	areas	
which	have	been	subject	to	a	lengthy	dispute,	such	as	border	
delimitation	and	co-operation	on	the	control	over	 the	move-
ment	of	people.
•	 Eastern	 European	 countries	 should	 take	more	 effective	 lob-
bying	 actions	 in	 EU	member	 states,	 including through an 
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intensified exchange of information and strengthening 
contacts with the institutions in charge of security in in-
dividual eu member states (and	not	concentrating	only	on	
EU	agencies).	This	could	reduce	the	fear	of	a	possible	influx	of	
irregular	migrants	from	the	East	in	these	EU	member	states	
and	dispel	many	myths	in	this	area.	Although	visa	talks	have	
been	 conducted	 in	 the	bilateral	 format,	partner	 states	 could	
also	try	to	coordinate	their	negotiating	stances	between	them-
selves	(not	only	as	part	of	the	EaP).
marta Jaroszewicz
